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Natural Law Ethics: A Comparison of the Theravāda and Thomistic Traditions
David Lantigua
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the topic of natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic
traditions by utilizing the methodology of comparative religious ethics. Approaches to the
method such as ethical formalism, ethical naturalism, and narrative ethics are assessed
with the author opting for a multidimensional approach that is religious and ethical. This
multidimensional approach, as defined by William Schweiker, conducts natural law
inquiry from a hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity and democratic pluralism.
The hermeneutical standpoint warrants a historicizing of natural law ethics that is
compatible with modern secularity instead of a classicist metaphysical worldview. To
achieve this task, the thought of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and Jewish
theologian David Novak is used to formulate a concept of a natural law tradition. Three
normative features define the natural law traditions in question: rationality as traditionconstituted, revelation as a historical phenomenon, and natural law as a cultural construct
that is both comparative and ontological.
The central claim of this thesis is that the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions
provide a similar conceptual apparatus for rational discourse that can locate ethical
commonalities and respect differences across traditions. The commonality between
ii

traditions is secured in natural law ethics because these traditions adhere to a constitutive
truth that is the objective ground of all truths and of nature which designates a shared
humanity. On the other hand, these natural law traditions are able to at least respect
difference because they recognize the autonomy of other traditions outside of and preexisting their own. Natural law ethics in these religious traditions therefore avoids the
ethical challenges of relativism and authoritarianism.
Both traditions define a concept of “nature” with a proper teleological orientation
for the moral life. “Nature” is an open category in these traditions that can never be fully
defined. This demonstrates how these natural law traditions avoid ontological violence.
The overall claim is that natural law ethics, which are evident in the Theravāda and
Thomistic traditions, offer something essential to a pluralistic secular democracy: an
unconditioned view of human dignity that protects inalienable rights because it is secured
by a higher law than civil laws.
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Introduction: Ethics in a World of Neighbors
Philosophers… have concerned themselves with morality as a science: they
wanted to furnish the rational ground of morality – and every philosopher
hitherto has believed he has furnished this rational ground; morality itself,
however, was taken as ‘given’. […] they did not so much as catch sight of the real
problems of morality—for these come into view only if we compare many
moralities.1
Friedrich Nietzsche did catch sight of some of the “real problems” of morality via
his genealogical critique and sweeping comparison of modernity and the ancients. He
uncovered the traps of foundationalist certainties and disabused many philosophical
students of the Enlightenment who claimed to be past “God” and “religion” that their
science and rationalism were mere masks disguising a will to power. Their claims to truth
based on facts were no more legitimate than Christianity’s metaphysical claims derived
from faith.
Although Nietzsche did compare many moralities, he still did not escape the
modernist tendency and Enlightenment security of reducing all phenomena to a single
explanation. Morality was, for him, “an assessment and ranking of human drives and
actions.” 2 Moral diversity, therefore, was an inevitable outcome because “the conditions
of the survival of one community have been very different from the conditions of another

1

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §186, in A Nietzsche Reader, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(England: Penguin Books, 2003), 104-105.
2
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science §116, in Existentialism: Basic Writings, 2nd ed., Charles Guignon
and Derk Pereboom, eds. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 138.
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community.”3 In other words, morality is seen as nothing more than the arbitrary
convention of wills and drives competing for survival and power in a particular historical
situation. Nietzsche, in this regard, was no different than his Enlightenment predecessors
by locating a single ground of morality. Not a rational ground to morality, but rather, an
irrational one.
Nietzsche’s anti-foundationalist legacy and distaste for rational morality has lived
on under the gamut of much “postmodern” thinking. Without a language of rationality for
honest communication, an unbridgeable gap lay between discourse partners according to
many thinkers captivated by the postmodern imagination. This outlook has welcomed the
arrival of the postmodern stranger who is radically other. The alterity of the other is so
profound that we are unsure and perhaps even unable to adjudicate whether or not this
stranger is hostile or friendly, demonic or divine.4 For ethics, the issue of alterity and
otherness is an important and necessary one, but of equal importance is the issue of
commonality and sameness. Meeting the postmodern stranger who is radically different
than us is not our aim. Instead, our aim is to meet our global neighbor who is never too
far to be a stranger and yet not necessarily close enough to be family. It is within this
category of the neighbor who is both different and common that our investigation of
ethics shall proceed.
I echo Nietzsche’s position that we can only catch sight of the real problems of
morality by way of comparison. Our moral situation demands that we confront the reality
that we are living in a pluralistic age with diverse moralities. Everyday across the globe
people are taking life-threatening stands on moral positions. Some do so to the point of
3
4

Ibid.
See Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2003), Chapters 3 and 4.
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taking the lives of the enemy to protect a cause while others do so by letting themselves
die in order to redeem one. Comparing moralities or ethics is the underlying issue in this
investigation. This task of comparing ethics under the theme of neighborliness can yield
both our commonalities and differences. The method of comparing ethics will not be
through the lens of moral philosophy but of religious ethics.
For this investigation, I compare the religious ethics of Buddhism and
Christianity. I concentrate specifically on the issue of natural law in these religions as
articulated by the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. My thesis is that these natural law
traditions contain a similar conceptual apparatus for ethical thinking across traditions.
These natural law traditions fit our category of neighborliness in that they are able to
locate any “overlapping” with other traditions, but also locate and respect differences.
The commonality between persons is secured in natural law ethics because these
traditions adhere to an ultimate truth that is the objective ground of all truths and of
nature thus designating a shared humanity. On the other hand, these natural law traditions
are able to at least respect difference because they recognize the autonomy of other
traditions outside of and pre-existing their own. The natural law ethics of these religious
traditions can therefore avoid the ethical challenges of relativism and authoritarianism.
My overall claim is that natural law ethics offer something essential to a pluralistic
secular democracy: an unconditioned view of human dignity that can protect inalienable
rights because it is secured by a higher law than civil laws.
The method of inquiring about natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic
traditions will be through comparative religious ethics. Chapter 1 begins by situating the
field of comparative religious ethics within the academic study of religion. This will
vii

introduce us to two important approaches for the development of this field, the historicalempiricist approach of “ethical naturalism” by Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds and the
ethical formalist or “deep structure” approach by Ronald Green. The approaches used in
these thinkers set the parameters that launched the debate for the emergent field of
comparative religious ethics. Although commendable for their originality and depth, the
deep structure approach by Green and the ethical naturalism approach by Lovin and
Reynolds were subject to the dangers of easy translatability and incommensurability. In
other words, the approaches have a tendency to overemphasize sameness or difference.
These challenges of easy translatability and incommensurability to the field of
comparative religious ethics cannot go unaddressed. As Nietzsche pointed out, there is a
problem in locating a single model of rationality and a single ground, especially within
the pluralistic ethos of a secular democracy. This conceit of Enlightenment thinking that
has a tendency to inadequately address moral diversity has been associated with Green’s
approach. There is a totalizing tendency in this approach that locates a single ground and
method of rationality that Green refers to as the deep structure.
On the other hand, Nietzsche’s reactionary account of morality as irrational is far
less appealing. Contra Nietzsche, I argue that the problem for ethics is not in using a
language of rationality or locating its ground. To reject rationality in toto is an invitation
to the extreme relativism of the skeptic. Therefore, we are not attempting to uncover a
single rational ground, but rather, multiple grounds of rationality. The work of Lovin and
Reynolds does just this by identifying various rationalities within single traditions.
Although this approach stresses moral differences, it does so at the expense of comparing
rationalities and moralities across traditions. In a pluralistic age threatened by moral
viii

relativism, the approach of ethical naturalism seems unable to sufficiently address this
problem because its primary aim is to describe the uniqueness of each tradition, not
compare traditions.
The issue of moral diversity and the challenges of relativism and totalism provide
the context in which the narrative approach of Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant and the
multidimensional approach of William Schweiker are framed. These two approaches
have been classified under the “hermeneutical-dialogical” paradigm of doing comparative
religious ethics. These authors never cease to think about religious ethics apart from the
hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity and pluralism, which I am adopting.
Attempting to bridge religious worlds in order to promote common goods and religious
humanism belongs to the comparative and constructive tasks employed by these authors.
I also take up these tasks and specifically utilize Schweiker’s multidimensional model for
natural law inquiry.
A multidimensional approach to natural law aims for scope, not autonomy. That is
to say, we are attempting to retrieve, in some part, the rich ethical complexity of these
natural law traditions without claiming to have an all-embracing methodological solution.
The various dimensions that will be used to retrieve these traditions include normative,
descriptive, fundamental, practical, and metaethical. All of these dimensions fit into our
inquiry in some way, with the normative dimension standing out as the most central
given our context of moral diversity and the threat of normlessness. Furthermore, this
approach to natural law ethics considers the duty of a scholar to be religious and ethical.
This means that the traditional strict boundaries between theology and philosophy, church
and academy, religion and state, and prescription and description will not be present.
ix

Instead, the relationship between disciplines and conceptual spaces is a fluid one that will
strive to be mutually enriching rather than antagonistic.
Our inquiry into natural law from a hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity
and pluralism begins with formulating a concept of a natural law tradition. That is my
concern in chapter 2. The purpose of this chapter is to set the parameters of what we are
looking for in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. The concept of a natural law
tradition will show us how truth, law, and authority in these traditions function in similar
ways. For this task, I turn to the work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and
Jewish theologian David Novak. These thinkers will help us define three normative
features of a natural law tradition: rationality as tradition-constituted; revelation as a
historical phenomenon; and natural law as a cultural construct that is both comparative
and ontological. These features contribute to the project of historicizing natural law
without denying a tradition’s claims to ultimate truth.
Chapter 3 will explicitly defend the thesis of this investigation: that the natural
law traditions in question show analogous structures of rational ethical discourse. The
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions delineate categories of natural law discourse that
recognizes the autonomy and limits of other traditions and the need for special insight
and revelation for moral development and liberation. I will use the categories of
“general” and “special” to distinguish these modes of discourse across traditions and
within one’s tradition. The important point is that neither one of these modes of discourse
is purely isolated from the other. In fact, it is because of the “general” knowledge
common to all persons that the “special” insight or revelation has any meaningfulness at
all.
x

Chapter 4 addresses the fundamental dimension of our inquiry, the issues of
ontology and ethics. The concept of “nature” is necessary to any natural law thinking, and
I consider how these traditions define the term. But if nature is fully defined then an
account commits ontological violence. These natural law traditions, I claim, avoid
ontological violence by locating an indefinable or unconditional dimension of human
existence that is constituted by an ultimate truth. I claim that the way a religious
practitioner of these traditions is able to understand this truth is by pursuing the
hypergood. The term hypergood denotes an ethical category. It refers to the specific telos
or aim that all agents eventually aspire toward thus shaping the moral orientation of a
person’s life.
My investigation concludes by suggesting how natural law ethics can and do
contribute to socio-political matters, especially within a modern democracy such as our
own. The natural law ethics of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions contain the
resources for critically engaging any unjust institution or law on the grounds of higher
truth and human dignity. These traditions posit a form of rationality whose warrants is
determined by an ultimate measure or law superceding all temporal and worldly
standards.
Lastly, these natural law traditions demonstrate an ethic of neighborliness. This
ethic illustrates that no matter how wrong or strange another individual’s actions might
be there is always the possibility of communicating with them in some rational manner.
That is because they are always within proximity of us in virtue of their humanity. They
always have the closeness of a neighbor.

xi

Chapter One: Situating Comparative Religious Ethics
In 2006, for the first time in the history of the American Academy of Religion, a
session was organized at the annual meeting for the group on “Comparative Religious
Ethics.” The session was convened by Aaron Stalnaker, author of the newly acclaimed
Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine.1
Although Stalnaker is not the first to address the topic of religious ethics from a
comparative method, his work represents the latest attempt to refine the method of
comparative religious ethics as the field continues to define itself alongside other
methods in the academic study of religion.
In the spirit of Religionswissenschaft pioneers like Max Müller, comparative
methodology is set upon the premise that “all higher knowledge is acquired by
comparison.”2 However, the disciplinary boundaries that have been erected in American
universities to protect the academic study of religion as a social science against anything
remotely resembling theological reflection was not characteristic of Müller’s humanistic
science rooted in charitable hermeneutics, reverence, and loyalty to truth when
investigating the subject of religion.3 Although quite unconventional for his time, Müller

1

Aaron Stalnaker, Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine,
(Washington, DC:Georgetown University Press, 2006).
2
Max Müller, “Plea for a Science of Religion” in Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed.
Jacques Waardenburg (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 91.
3
Consider the following excerpt from Müller’s lecture: “No one – this I can promise – who attends these
lectures, be he a Christian or Jew, Hindu or Muslim, shall hear his own way of serving God spoken of
irreverently. But true reverence does not consist in declaring a subject, because it is dear to us, to be unfit
for free and honest inquiry: far from it! True reverence is shown in treating every subject, however sacred,
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conversed with believers in theological circles, especially missionaries, because he saw
the need for Christians to sympathetically engage other religions by finding a common
ground.4
This nineteenth century European “science of religion” method does not
correspond with the view of contemporary American scholar Donald Wiebe. In the 1988
article entitled, “Why the Academic Study of Religion?” Wiebe claims that the discipline
is meant to serve “purely intellectual/scientific reasons and not as instrumental in the
achievement of religious, cultural, political or other ends.”5 The study of religion is solely
construed as the pursuit of “objective” knowledge derived from religious phenomena,
which serves as its data to generalize and establish facts. Wiebe, while invoking the
message of Max Weber’s “Science as Vocation,” is prey to the modern positivist conceit
that divorces facts and values. In Wiebe’s view, the study of religion exists purely for the
sake of theoretical reflection in an isolated academy thus betraying the original intent of
Religionswissenschaft as public vocation.
Although none of the approaches to comparative religious ethics considered here
echo Wiebe’s insularity and scientism, the approaches of Ronald Green, Robin Lovin,
and Frank Reynolds have been influenced by the aims of modern philosophy and social
science. Indebted to the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the approach of Ronald
Green understands that all religions, regardless of time and place, demonstrate a universal
structure grounded in human reason for responding to moral conflicts. On the other hand,

however dear to us, with perfect confidence; without fear and without favor, with tenderness and love, by
all means, but, before all, with an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty to truth.”
4
Müller, 87.
5
Donald Wiebe, “Why the Academic Study of Religion?” in Theory and Method in the Study of Religion,
ed. Carl Olson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 39.
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for Lovin and Reynolds, who take the philosopher David Hume as their cue, comparative
religious ethics has an empirical-historical task of describing the diverse accounts of
morality evident across traditions and within single traditions. In their view, reason is
thoroughly contextualized and understood as the product of the interaction between
cosmogonic myths, rituals, and feelings. This contrasts radically from Green’s view that
religions exhibit an ahistorical formal structure of moral reasoning.
The appointment of Christian theologian Margaret Miles as president of the
American Academy of Religion in 1999 represented a new and controversial trend in the
academic study of religion that hearkens back to the vision of Müller. The initial task of
her presidential address was to challenge the boundaries between “the study of religion”
and “theological studies.”6 Miles considered these disciplinary boundaries, which are
often hostile to each other, as unhelpful. She encouraged members of whatever academic
standing to work constructively together for the common good. This is only possible by
bringing “religious studies” as an integrated or mutually beneficial discipline into the
public sphere.
Although many of the older scientific methodologists in the academic study of
religion were unconvinced by Miles’ plea, the field of comparative religious ethics today
has preserved her spirit of sensitivity toward context. By situating religious ethics within
a context of the plurality of traditions and diverse moralities the field is engaged with the
critical resources that allow for the reconstruction of religious traditions in order to
promote the common good. This is the religious humanism at work in the approaches of
Darrell Fasching, Dell deChant, and William Schweiker. These approaches are distinct in
6

Margaret Miles, “Becoming Answerable for What We See” in Theory and Method in the Study of
Religion, ed. Carl Olson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 42.
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that Fasching and deChant offer a narrative approach and Schweiker offers a
multidimensional approach, yet both have been classified under the curricular paradigm
of “hermeneutical-dialogical.”7 They begin from “the fact that we live in a morally and
religiously pluralistic world.”8 The project of comparative ethics, in their view, is to
engage the stranger in continual dialogue in an effort to see our world anew through their
eyes. What is especially important in this paradigm is the hermeneutic task of seeking
understanding by crossing over into other traditions and bridging religious worlds. This
hermeneutical paradigm is the standpoint of the approach adopted in this thesis.
Approaches to Comparison
The methodology of comparative religious ethics owes its genesis to the work of
two highly original approaches by Frank Reynolds and Robin Lovin, and Ronald Green.9
My concern here is to give a summary of these approaches and isolate potential strengths
and weaknesses in their accounts. I also consider the narrative approach adopted by
Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant that offers an alternative to these approaches. Their
approach frames the discipline within the context of relativism and ethnocentrism thereby
taking a hermeneutical standpoint that is used in my investigation of natural law
traditions. My summary and analysis in no way exhausts the literature on comparative
religious ethics that has been published over the last couple of decades.10 More recently,

7

Sumner B. Twiss, “Four Paradigms in Teaching Comparative Religious Ethics” in Explorations in Global
Ethics: Comparative Religious Ethics and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Sumner B. Twiss and Bruce Grelle
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 16-19.
8
Ibid., 17
9
Also consider David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method, (New
York: Harper and Row, 1978). Although I am not addressing this approach, it too deserves credit for its
contribution to the inception of comparative religious ethics.
10
One example includes the comparative virtues approach by Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories
of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990).
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with the inclusion of Stalnaker’s work, comparative religious ethics has developed some
exciting new approaches to inquiry.11
In Religion and Moral Reason, Ronald Green argues that he has uncovered a
“deep structure” to the method of reasoning in religion. He states in his introduction, “I
wish to show that the most basic processes of religious reasoning are the same
everywhere and give rise, in understandable ways, to diverse religious expressions.”12
Green’s approach is to investigate the religions of the world and demonstrate how they
meet the demands of the deep structure and also how they are different from one another.
There are essentially three components to this deep structure of religious reasoning: 1)
the “moral point of view” or impartiality 2) beliefs affirming reality of moral retribution
and 3) “transmoral” beliefs that suspend moral judgment.13
Although the deep structure is a priori for all people at all times, Green claims
that morality across the global religious landscape is not identical in terms of its beliefs,
rules, and practices. He states that one “must expect this variability of norms.”14 But this
is not an invitation to ethical relativism. Instead, following the logic of Kant, Green
asserts that the application of the universal structure to different situations may yield
different conclusions. Another reason for difference among traditions is that some
religions have “evolved” more than others. In his treatment of the indigenous religions of
Confucianism and Daoism in China, Green claims that they failed “to meet the
conceptual needs dictated by reason’s deep structure” and as a result left a vacuum that
11

See, for example, the conceptual metaphors approach formulated in Edward Slingerland, “Conceptual
Metaphor Theory as Methodology for Comparative Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of
Religion 72, no. 1 (March 2004), 1-31 and the special issue, “The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning” in
Modern Theology 22, no. 3, (July 2006).
12
Ronald Green, Religion and Moral Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), xii.
13
Ibid., 3.
14
Ibid., 9.
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Buddhism could fill.15 What religions can and do share in common are often basic rules
of morality, which include some of the following: no killing wantonly, no lying or
breaking promises, giving to the needy, and making reparation for wrongs committed.16
Of course, certain cultures may promote contrary rules such as the abandoning of elderly
parents in Eskimo communities. But these anomalies occur for various circumstantial
reasons, like strenuous environmental conditions. The deep structure never changes; it is
the “basic method of thinking about choices and making decisions.”17 Therefore, Green
eliminates the possibility of anything like ethical relativism by appealing to the
universality of the deep structure and showing how this method can often, though not
necessarily, result in basic rules of morality.
The focus of the empirical approach presented in Cosmogony and Ethical Order
by Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds is to navigate the contours of the relationship
between ethics and human-social-cosmic origins in various cultures. Lovin and Reynolds
recognize the “impulse to link moral orientations to accounts of cosmic origins” in
traditional cultures and argue that “natural order provides the foundation for much of
everyday moral thinking.”18 Furthermore, the choice and judgment of moral agents is
justified by appealing to cosmogonic myths. From the outset, they note that such familiar
concepts like natural law and principles of order, like Dao or dependent origination
(paticca-samuppāda), “can be interpreted as systematic expressions of a far more
widespread belief that truly significant actions recapitulate the primordial cosmogenesis

15

Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 11
17
Ibid., 9
18
Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, “In the Beginning,” in Cosmogony and Ethical Order, ed. Robin
Lovin and Frank Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 2.
16
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or participate in a pattern established outside of the flux of ordinary events.”19 Thus, the
authors locate a tradition’s moral resources in the myth of the founding event or
cosmogony. In their approach, observing mainstream religious and indigenous cultural
systems in light of each tradition’s cosmogonic myths provides the empirical data. The
approach of Lovin and Reynolds extends an invitation to the research data provided by
anthropologists, cultural historians, and historians of religion.20
Rather than turning to the modern philosophical language of Kant’s ethical
formalism, Lovin and Reynolds interpret data through an empirically-grounded ethical
naturalism indebted to David Hume. This is an important shift in methodology that
allows for the possibility of “diversity of human conceptions of the good life.”21 The
approach of Lovin and Reynolds begins from the premise that there is a diversity of
ethical languages both among and within religious traditions. Instead of appealing to a
view of reason that is pure, undefiled, and the same at all times and places, their account
of rationality and moral judgment are “complex equilibrations of fact, principle, and
feeling.”22
Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, by Darrell Fasching and
Dell deChant, provides a model for understanding religious ethics situated in the
post/modern period defined by the demonic legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.23 In a
modern, scientific, and industrial age in which techno-bureaucratic rationality has often
led to a demise of ethical consciousness, Faching and deChant argue that comparative
19

Ibid., 1.
Ibid., 4
21
Ibid., 9
22
Ibid., 18
23
Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 2001).
20
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religious ethics must confront the challenges posed by genocide, ethnocentrism,
pluralism, and relativism. The authors undertake the project of forging a cross-cultural
global religious ethic of human dignity and human liberation rooted in the experience of
the holy and ancient stories of wrestling with the stranger evident in all the major world
religions. The process of engaging other traditions through stories amounts to “the way of
all the earth,” or seeking mutual illumination that is reflected in the “passing over,
coming back” experiences that have been practiced by twentieth century religious figures
like Mohandas K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Thich Nhat Hanh.
The approach adopted to achieve the goal of insight between traditions is
narrative interpretation rooted in the experience of the holy. Thus, the approach is
fundamentally dialogical and spiritual in its style. For example, Gandhi’s interpretation of
the Bhagavad-Gītā was deeply shaped by his experience of reading Jesus’ Sermon on the
Mount. Narrative and emotion, rather than theory and reason, are the sources of ethical
action in religion. The crucial human faculty that allows this to happen is empathy.
According to the authors, “reason must follow, not precede emotion.”24 Furthermore,
spiritual practices such as prayer, fasting, meditation, and study are also essential to the
moral life of religious practitioners.
The criteria that Fasching and deChant use to gauge whether or not a story,
institution, belief, or social group is ethical are the tendencies of the holy and the
sacred.25 Although both tendencies may exist simultaneously in a social group or person,
they represent radically different ways of responding to otherness. The holy, illustrated
by the figure of Socrates and his interior compulsion to question, refers to a personal
24
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experience of the infinite and ultimate that promotes dignity and justice for all humans,
including the stranger. The sacred tendency within societies and humans enforce
homogeneity at the expense of what is different. Sacred societies tend to designate what
is different as profane and this can often issue forth in acts of hostility and violence
toward the stranger. Whereas an ethic of the holy provokes questioning and doubt toward
the social-moral order, sacred societies protect it by eliminating that which calls it into
question.
Challenges in Comparative Religious Ethics
The project of comparative religious ethics, as the narrative approach of Fasching
and deChant demonstrates, must be able to respond to current moral problems. For these
thinkers, comparative religious ethics begins with “the serious challenge of cultural and
ethical relativism.”26 I argue that the both the deep structure and ethical naturalism
approaches are unable to sufficiently address the challenge of moral diversity and
relativism. The works of Green, Lovin, and Reynolds are subject to the epistemological
temptations of modern thinking that tend towards totalism and relativism.
Totalism refers to the attempt to homogenize all religious and moral traditions
into a single theory of rationality that can be derived independently of culture and
context. This moral outlook is identified with Kant’s Enlightenment project of justifying
morality that appeals to a universal structure of reason. A moral theory such as Green’s
that strives to demonstrate that all religious traditions reason from a deep structure does
not sufficiently account for the autonomy of different traditions. Ethical relativism, on the
other hand, refers to the absence of normative criteria for adjudicating across moral
26
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traditions. Although not equal to cultural relativism, it is an outlook that has been
associated with the modern social sciences. By adhering to the descriptive aim of modern
social science, ethical naturalism is less concerned with contemporary context, or what I
am referring to as hermeneutical standpoint. Therefore, the constructive task of locating
norms across traditions that promote the common good is not a facet of their work, and
this proves to be a limitation of the approach. Let us consider these challenges in more
detail.
Kant’s version of reason, pure and undefiled, was cast independent of traditional
religion and its attendant “superstitions, supernatural dogmas, and cultic practices.”27
This is the premise of Kant’s “secularization of morality”28 in which the moral law within
(the good will) is expressive of the universal law (categorical imperative), neither of
which is grasped through divine revelation but by pure practical reason. As Kant so aptly
put it, the good will is “determined by reason alone.”29 Religion is useful in so much as it
remains ‘within the bounds of reason.’ Any of religion’s superficial characteristics are
only accidental and ultimately of no moral worth to the agent’s rational will.
Although Green’s account lacks the kind of Enlightenment hostility toward
traditional religion evident in Kant, Green maintains the view that there is a single
process of moral and religious reasoning that is the same everywhere.30 We noted that
moral diversity, according to Green, was the result of historical and environmental
circumstances because the deep structure is a universal process of human reasoning.
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Therefore, his response to the problem of ethical relativism is to deny the existence of
real moral differences because everyone shares the same exact method of formal
reasoning evident in the deep structure. Green argues that “religions must be viewed as
evolving rational systems that strain over time to move toward greater sensitivity to
reason’s agenda.”31 The deep structure presented by Green stands outside of history and
functions like Kant’s timeless a prioris.
The deep structure approach totalizes moral and religious diversity by subsuming
difference into a single account of rationality. Any of religion’s features like beliefs,
stories, rituals, and doctrines are superficial additions generated by historical and
environmental contingency. Although Green considers these features to be the source of
diverse religious expressions, they are “imperfect or ‘ragged’ cultural creations.”32 In
Green’s account, religions are only different on the surface. What is universal and what is
unchanging is the formal structure or method of moral decision-making. The problem
with such a view is that it appears to neglect any “deep” moral differences originating
from different ultimate truths across religions thus forsaking the possibility of achieving a
genuine appreciation and respect of otherness. Nor is it able to allow the possibility of
different accounts of rationality among a plurality of traditions.
The empirical approach of Lovin and Reynolds avoids a universal account of
formal reasoning and posits instead particular accounts of rationality that are relative to
each tradition. In this sense, it resolves the weakness of Green’s approach. The moral life
of communities lies at the intersection of “worldviews and norms.”33 Instead of viewing
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beliefs, cosmogonic myths, rituals, and feelings, as superficial, Lovin and Reynolds see
these complex relationships as the empirical ground of rationality that is both natural and
observable. As such, these cultural artifacts provide the data or content of rationality for
the historian and anthropologist of religion to study.
Although the comparative approach of ethical naturalism aims at “empathetic
understanding and appreciation of cultural-moral differences and similarities,”34 it has a
shortcoming that should not be overlooked. By aligning itself solely with the descriptive
aim of the social sciences, this approach seeks no constructive aim of religious humanism
or critical engagement with the religious traditions. Therefore, the empirical approach of
ethical naturalism is not weak because it makes untenable claims; it is weak because of
what it is unable to claim.
The authors reject outright any Newtonian solution to the problem of ethical
relativism that is like the incontrovertible law of gravitation. They seem to deny the
possibility of something like a moral law precept (e.g. prohibition of rape or torture)
evident across many traditions that can be used to adjudicate moral differences. When
moral traditions conflict, the empiricists can only hope, along with the pragmatists, that
the parties involved will eventually reach agreement or consensus.35 At least with
Green’s account, there is some way of finding common moral ground in the form of
precepts across traditions that is worth defending against those who would seek to ignore
or eliminate them. The problem of moral relativism that Lovin and Reynolds appear to
shirk must be addressed in comparative religious ethics in order to overcome relativism’s
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cheap notion of tolerance that might allow dangerous forms of life to flourish.36
Moreover, this public concern is in keeping with the Max Müller’s view of religious
studies that Margaret Miles echoes.
The weakness of the empirical approach is further illustrated in the sense that the
authors “set aside the interesting question of what ways of thinking lead to the rejection
of a prevailing moral system on apparently moral grounds.”37 It is precisely this question
that cannot be set aside. In avoiding the question, their approach overlooks the issue of
how traditional myths and worldviews might have perpetuated prejudices and unjust
structures within society that oppressed certain groups such as women and slaves. On this
issue, the hermeneutical-dialogical paradigm stands out in its veracity. Critical inquiry of
religious traditions inherently belongs to discipline of religious studies. It belongs to the
constructive task in the method of comparative religious ethics.
A Multidimensional Approach to Natural Law
In The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (2006), editor William
Schweiker suggests an alternative approach to comparative religious ethics that he
identifies as “a multidimensional account of inquiry”38 This model of inquiry affirms
certain strengths in the two approaches of ethical formalism and ethical naturalism while
avoiding some of the shortcomings. As we noted, a weakness of Green’s approach is that
he attempts “to isolate one formal structure of reason” – the deep structure – to explain
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universal morality and not allow the possibility of different accounts of rationality.39
Although Green’s formalist approach comes up short in accounting for genuine diversity,
it succeeds, according to Schweiker, in construing “ethics” as an ‘intellectual construct.’
Moreover, Green does make the issue of finding norms and precepts one of his primary
concerns.
On the other hand, ethical naturalism begins from the brute fact of moral
diversity, of which we are adopting. The problem is that Lovin and Reynolds do not
suggest a way out of relativism.40 The authors are concerned with “worldviews and
norms” within a tradition but not between traditions. Therefore, very little comparison, if
any at all, is actually conducted in their approach. Nonetheless, this is also one of the
great strengths of ethical naturalism. By focusing on a single tradition and describing its
multiple cosmogonies, beliefs, and practices, the authors do give rich and detailed
accounts of moral diversity and rationality within traditions.41
A multidimensional approach investigates “the ‘interacting’ dimensions of ethics
that aim to explicate a religion’s account of and directions for ordering existence and
conduct in the moral space of life.”42 These include the descriptive, normative, practical,
fundamental, and metaethical dimensions. I would also add that the multidimensional
model should not be limited to these nor should we demarcate the dimensions as if they
were wholly separate from each other. In the edited volume, Schweiker uses this
multidimensional model to describe the layout and scope of the book. For Schweiker,
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“Scope, rather than autonomy, will be essential in deciding the validity of claims.”43 In
this thesis, I will adopt this multidimensional model of inquiry to analyze and suggest the
scope of natural law ethics within the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. Let us
consider briefly how each of these dimensions might fit in our investigation of natural
law traditions.
The descriptive dimension is evident in the approach of ethical naturalism. Lovin
and Reynolds give accounts of the “wildly complex and different ways” religious
practitioners construe the moral life within a single religious tradition like Buddhism, for
example.44 Pointing to this diversity within traditions is the greatest strength of their
approach. Within Buddhism, Thai Theravāda Buddhists, Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhists,
Vietnamese Mahayana Buddhists, and Japanese Zen Buddhists, are all traditions
expressing the variety of Buddhist practice. Moreover, within any one of these traditions,
greater specificity exists, as Frank Reynolds’ work on Theravāda Buddhism has shown.
Reynolds recognizes that there are two interdependent but distinct modes of ethical life
shaped by overlapping cosmologies: samsaric and Buddhic.45 Other scholars have also
referred to this distinction as the karmic and nirvanic paths that are sometimes used to
distinguish the monastic and lay lifestyles.46 Another aspect of the descriptive dimension
in religious ethics is that it “is linked to other interpretive disciplines.”47 My investigation
will utilize the interpretive resources of moral philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre
and Charles Taylor and the Jewish political theology of David Novak.
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The normative dimension is emphasized the most in this thesis. The rationale for
this has to do with my decision, alongside Fasching and Schweiker, to frame comparative
religious ethics within the context of moral diversity and a pluralistic society. With the
ensuing risk of normlessness inaugurated by ethical relativism, the normative dimension
in comparative ethics is especially important. This dimension highlights the norms and
values that ought to guide human life according to the traditions in question. But there is
also sensitivity to the “distinct and sometimes conflicting sources” of those norms and
values within a single tradition.48 Two common sources often articulated by religious
traditions include reason, the native intelligence of human beings, and revelation, or the
ultimate truth claims preserved by the historical community. In our inquiry into natural
law ethics, we will see that reason and revelation are two sources that are inextricably
bound, with the special revelation or insight as that which illuminates natural or mundane
reason. I will also be using the term normative in reference to discourse. By using natural
law as a mode of normative discourse the traditions in question distinguish between two
levels of discourse: those within the tradition and those outside the tradition. These two
levels translate into the general and special categories of discourse. Formulating the
modes of natural law discourse will support my thesis that natural law traditions contain
the conceptual resources for transcending traditions to find commonality and differences
with others in an effort to pursue the ultimate truth.
The practical dimension discloses the point that all moral thinking and judgments
are situated in practices. That is because, “Traditions develop complex and subtle patterns
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of moral reasoning in order to answer the practical questions of life.”49 Aristotle was
among the first great philosophers to show that theoretical knowledge can only be
achieved through praxis. This emphasis on practice opens us to the important ethical
concept known as virtue. For Aristotle, the virtues are acquired “by first having actually
practiced them” (NE 1103a32). In other words, habit (ethos) produces moral (ethike)
virtue (NE 1103a18). This view assures that ethics is always concrete and lived and never
too abstract and theoretical. In our investigation, virtues such as prudence, justice,
compassion, and charity are crucial to understanding the Theravāda and Thomistic
natural law traditions. When considering natural law ethics within religious traditions we
must keep this practical dimension at the front of our inquiry, especially since natural
law is often misrepresented as an abstract moral theory about a neutral law stemming
from a transcendent lawgiver that has ultimately no effect on actual life and public
discourse.50
Since religions present “fantastically complex accounts of agency,” a fundamental
dimension in ethical inquiry is needed.51 As an example, within a Christian framework,
moral agency might integrate the complex relations between sin, the will, conscience, and
God’s grace. These elements are all fundamental to moral agency and reveal how
religions offer a rich language for understanding moral sources. For both of the natural
law traditions, the concept of “nature” is fundamental for understanding how moral
sources operate. Therefore, an ontological account is necessary for natural law ethics.
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Moral philosopher Charles Taylor has noted that “our sense of admiration and
awe” for certain capacities that we believe to be in God, the Buddha, or Muhammad “is
what empowers us to live up to them.”52 The concept of the good that is related to the
question, “What is the good life?” focuses the concern on moral sources. The norms,
values, and virtues that define the religious ethics of a tradition are constituted by moral
sources. Applying this fundamental dimension to our inquiry will bring out the various
goods that natural law accounts identify as essential to moral agency and offer proper
orientation for human “nature.” I use Charles Taylor’s categories for distinguishing these
goods as life goods (or virtues), hypergoods (the aim of moral agency) and constitutive
goods (that which empowers the moral agent) that have a fundamental teleological
orientation.53
The metaethical dimension is the last of Schweiker’s multidimensional model and
it is often the most overlooked or neglected. He notes that, “Every religion, despite what
modern critics hold, purports to be truth seeking.”54 In the case of Green’s deep structure
approach, the metaethical dimension has superiority over all other dimensions. I am
careful not to repeat this methodological limitation of assigning a single structure of
reason to all traditions. Instead, we will adopt Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of rationality as
tradition-constituted as our metaethical language. Each natural law tradition’s standard of
rationality is defined or constituted by a unique conception of ultimate truth that orders
all particular truths.
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As a note, our analysis of these traditions cannot strip them of their respective
metaphysical and cosmological worldviews. Just as Lovin and Reynolds have argued,
“worldview and norms,” or cosmology and ethics, are inseparable. Therefore, our
analysis of natural law traditions cannot ignore metaphysics and cosmology because
these living traditions are truth seeking and “nature” or ontology is always situated within
this context. But metaphysics and cosmology are not the fundamental dimensions
because ethics and ontology reserve that position. Instead, they are at best secondary,
serving as the “integral heuristic structure” for understanding moral agency and the
pursuit of truth through questioning.55
Religions often posit a constitutive good that is the originating source of the moral
life but also identify this as the constitutive truth as well. Natural law is a metaethical
category since it suggests that all human beings have access to the moral structure that is
embedded in a metaphysical or cosmological worldview. But these accounts part from
Green in the sense that natural law is understood as originating from a metaphysical or
cosmological context that is situated within a tradition grounded in special revelation or
special insight. In other words, the natural law that can be known by moral agents is
revealed by the constitutive truth, be it the Dhamma or God. Natural law is nothing like
the deep structure which offers an ahistorical account of religious reason. In the next
chapter, I consider a tradition-constituted model of rationality and a notion of revelation
as a historical phenomenon that argues for the explanatory power of historical
contingency. Both of these views will be compatible with our concept of a natural law
tradition from our hermeneutical standpoint.
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Hermeneutical Standpoint
Our investigation began by situating the field of comparative religious ethics
within the global context of pluralism and moral diversity. This is characteristic of the
“hermeneutical-dialogical paradigm” that we are aiming to achieve alongside Fasching,
deChant, and Schweiker. Fasching and deChant, I noted, claimed that comparative
religious ethics must face the challenge of ethical relativism. The way out of this
problem, according to them, is to engage in dialogue regarding global ethical issues with
those of other religious and moral traditions. Some of the major global issues that are
addressed by Fasching and deChant include ethnocentrism, genocide, war, racism, and
sexism.
In my conclusion, I will turn to the question of human dignity within a secular
democratic context to see how the natural law traditions in question respond to this issue.
It is only from this kind of a hermeneutical and dialogical standpoint that comparative
religious ethics can promote “religious humanism” or “the way of all the earth.”
Twentieth century saints like Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. realized
this paradigm not only in their comparative studies of each other’s traditions, but also in
their socio-political pursuit of justice. Neither one strayed from keeping religious ethics
both “religious and ethical.”56
The term “global reflexivity” used by Schweiker refers to “the ways in which
communities appear in ‘the gaze of the other’.”57 It echoes what Fasching and deChant
refer to as the sympathetic process of “passing over” into another tradition to see the
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world from their eyes and “coming back” to one’s own tradition enriched.58 The religious
ethicist in this model “does not simply exist within or outside actual traditions. She or he
is always thinking at the lateral connections among communities, traditions, and
intellectual practices.”59
This concern for lateral connections is the aim of normative discourse. Natural
law traditions contain a bicameral view of normative discourse in which they can think
and communicate with those in their tradition and with those in other traditions. The
important point is that the dialogue partners adjust themselves accordingly and revise
their interpretations readily in light of new insights from the other. It makes these
traditions quite compatible, in theory at least, for working through global reflexivity
alongside others in economic, legal, political, ethical, and cultural matters.60
Tasks of Comparative Methodology
There are two tasks to our multidimensional hermeneutical approach to
comparative religious ethics: the comparative task and the constructive task. The
normative dimension, I pointed out, is the most important among the other dimensions in
this thesis because it responds directly to the problem of moral diversity. But this
dimension could decrease in importance depending on one’s hermeneutical standpoint.
As scholars within a secular and pluralistic society inheriting the disenchanted worldview
of technological modernity, our concern is with the preservation and articulation of
worthwhile norms and values. If not, our culture might fully succumb to the forces of
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radical individualism, instrumental reason, atomism, and meaninglessness.61 Therefore,
the dimensions of inquiry are relative to the hermeneutical standpoint of the scholar.
Meanwhile, the tasks of our methodology are not as flexible because they define the
process and aim of our investigation.
It may seem redundant to declare our task as comparative in the method of
comparative religious ethics. This point cannot be overstated because the reality is that
many approaches claim to do comparative religious ethics but very few actually succeed.
The empirical approach has done comparison the least across traditions. Lovin and
Reynolds and their followers succeed in doing comparison within a single tradition but
seem to have no concern comparing other traditions side by side. Green’s formalist
approach, on the surface, may look like he is doing comparison on a grand systematic
level. But I noted the limitations of this approach for reasons that include its apparent
lack of appreciation for moral diversity and autonomy.
I count the work of Fasching and deChant and the recent project of Aaron
Stalnaker among those who have done this successfully. The comparative task for them
has the purpose of achieving insight. Gandhi and King lived this comparative task in their
path toward nonviolence, of which Fasching and deChant refer to as the greatest ethical
response to injustice. It was attained through a “meeting and sharing of religious and
cultural insight.”62 Gandhi read and meditated on Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount and then
reinterpreted the Bhagavad-Gītā through the Gospel ethic of nonviolence. King, on the
other hand, reinterpreted his Christian social ethic in light of Gandhi’s operational
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technique of nonviolence. In scholarly academic terms, what these saintly lives translate
into and demonstrate is that the process of comparative research is one of moving back
and forth between religious worlds refining both the categories of analysis and one’s
initial hunches.63
This is the task set before us in our investigation of natural law ethics in the
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. The comparative task encourages us to place the
natural law traditions side by side in an effort to demonstrate how they are functionally
similar for establishing a complex account of moral agency within a specific moral
universe. Thus our scope in some way is narrowed to these natural law traditions. But
that is because I am not making a universalistic claim like Green that all religious
traditions demonstrate a natural law ethic that is a deep structure. Natural law thinking
may belong to various religious traditions, but it is only one more way of construing the
moral life among others. I claim that natural law traditions function by using similar
categories for discourse or dialogue that distinguishes general knowledge and special
knowledge. These parameters of discourse can serve as both a bridge and unity between
traditions to promote the common good and a way of designating moral differences.
The constructive task, or what Stalnaker refers to as the normative task, assists
ethical reflection amidst “our own pluralistic, conflicted, and possibility-strewn
contemporary context.”64 In other words, it reflects our hermeneutical standpoint and is
concerned with the “use of religious sources in meeting current problems.”65 But this is
not merely enough. With the comparative task in mind, scholars aid in the reconstruction
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of the religious traditions themselves amidst global reflexivity. This is why Schweiker
refers to the scholar’s involvement as both religious and ethical. She or he may have to
“extend religious enactments of the moral space of life,”66 especially if the religious
tradition is in some way betraying human dignity. There is no need to wear two hats in
this model of scholarly inquiry.
Situating natural law traditions within a hermeneutical context, most especially
moral diversity and democratic pluralism, will be our main attempt to pursue this
constructive task. The endpoint of this inquiry is to formulate a language of normative
discourse derived from the similar conceptual apparatus of these natural law traditions
that could be used to address global ethical issues such as human dignity and human
rights, interreligious dialogue, and secularity. Our purpose for using the method of
comparative religious ethics through a multidimensional hermeneutical approach is to
recover these natural law traditions in a way that maintains a level of religious integrity
that is amendable to our contemporary context and also suggest what these traditions can
constructively offer to moral debates in our global society.
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Chapter Two: The Concept of a Natural Law Tradition
Since the hermeneutical standpoint of this thesis is framed within a global context
of pluralism and moral diversity, the normative dimension is of great moral import to our
inquiry. In this chapter, we shall consider a few of the primary normative areas in the
natural law accounts of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. Our purpose for doing
this is to formulate a mode of normative discourse that is authentic to these natural law
traditions but is in line with our multidimensional hermeneutical inquiry. The areas of
normativity for natural law of interest to us include the concept of a natural law tradition,
its basis of authority and narrative context, and its mode of discourse. These normative
areas should provide the framework for understanding how these natural law traditions
avoid the pitfalls of authoritarianism and ethical relativism.
To achieve this from a hermeneutical standpoint, we must address the challenge
of a modern secular worldview such as our own. That means the natural law ethics of the
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions need to be sensitive to the historical turn of modern
and postmodern thinking that has demythologized what Bernard Lonergan refers to as the
‘classisict’ worldview: “classicism is no more than the mistaken view of conceiving
culture normatively and of concluding that there is just one human culture.”1 As a result,
there must be a degree of historicizing these natural law accounts. This does not require a
radical reinterpretation of the natural law traditions in question because as we shall see,
1
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their accounts of natural law are quite amendable to the contemporary worldview and
even have something to offer it. It will require us though to grant metaphysics and
cosmology a secondary role with ethics and ontology our fundamental dimension.
Metaphysics and cosmology serve as integral heuristic moral structures within which one
pursues the question of ultimate truth.
As part of our descriptive dimension of conversing with other disciplines, through
the help of Alasdair MacIntyre and David Novak, I will construct a concept of a natural
law tradition that is compatible with modern secularity and the Theravāda and Thomistic
traditions. This is not coincidental. In fact, MacIntyre’s concept of tradition is derived
specifically from his thoughtful analysis of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the
emergence of the Thomistic tradition.2 Similar to this account of tradition, but from a
theological perspective, is Novak’s notion of “historical communities,” which he
constructs from the natural law tradition of Judaism.3 A synthesis of their views affords
us a concept of natural law tradition that is compatible with the historical turn of modern
thinking without denying the tradition’s claims to truth. There will be three essential
features to this concept of a natural law tradition: a tradition-constituted model of
rationality, revelation as historical phenomenon, and natural law as a cultural construct
that is both comparative and ontological.
Rationality, Revelation, and Natural Law
Our starting point of formulating a concept of a natural law tradition compatible
with our hermeneutical standpoint is Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of rationality and
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tradition. MacIntyre historicizes rationality in the following way: “rationality itself… is a
concept with a history.”4 As many as there are traditions embodying their own histories,
so too are there “rationalities,” each providing its own standards of rational justification.
This account is similar to Lovin and Reynolds, except that as a moral philosopher
MacIntyre is willing to say a lot more about the issue of relativism.
In MacIntyre’s account, there is the possibility of a tradition being superior to
rival traditions.5 This happens when an alien tradition offers “a cogent and illuminating
explanation” to a tradition in epistemological crisis. This tradition in crisis adopts this
explanation for itself to establish internal coherence.6 Although the tradition in crisis is
still using its own standards of rational justification to measure the coherence and
cogency of the alien tradition’s explanation, it must acknowledge one fact: “the new
explanation does not stand in any substantive unity with the preceding history of the
tradition in crisis.”7
When considering religious traditions, I find MacIntyre’s language of “rival” and
“superior” traditions too antagonistic for our model. There has been enough sectarian
religious violence over the course of history and even today to necessitate an alternative
kind of discourse. Furthermore, recognizing the superiority of another philosophical or
political tradition is not nearly as difficult as claiming the superiority of another religious
tradition.8 But this does not take away from MacIntyre’s underlying point of value:
commensurability and translatability is possible in a rational way across traditions. What
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we are interested then is the possibility of other traditions illuminating one’s own
tradition. A person in one religious tradition might receive illumination from another
religious tradition but this need not conclude that the home tradition is inferior. If this
were the case, then MacIntyre’s account seems to imply the possibility of everyone
moving toward a single tradition based on the logical outcome and awareness of that
tradition’s rational superiority. This would only revert to a universalization or
homogenization of discourse, which we trying to avoid in our model. Instead, it makes
more sense for religious traditions to consider the possibility that another tradition,
religious or not, might illuminate their own understanding of truth. This grants thereby a
level of autonomy to the other tradition. In this way, two traditions can have shared
insight. It is especially evident in the life of Gandhi when he claimed that the Sermon on
the Mount was the interpretive key for understanding the Gītā message of nonviolence.9
Let us now consider MacIntyre’s view of rationality and what he means by
standards. Rationality, which is purely contingent upon history, is a tradition-constituted
enterprise.10 But if traditions provide the content for rational justification, what then is the
content of traditions? According to MacIntyre, a tradition “is an historically extended,
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which
constitute that tradition.”11 Those goods might refer to certain virtues like justice and
integrity, what MacIntyre refers to as particular or limited goods.12 The exercise of
virtues, in part, determines the health of a tradition. But, more importantly, these goods
are shaped by an overriding good or telos that constitutes the tradition. The overriding
9
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good “warrants putting other goods in a subordinate place.”13 I shall have more to say
about this later because our natural law accounts require conceptions of the good that are
set within a teleological framework. Achieving this good is determined by whether or not
one is in harmony with the directedness of the higher law.
A telos or overriding good for a tradition is a primary constituent in shaping the
rationality of that tradition. That is because the pursuit of an overriding good that orders
the limited goods “gives a tradition its particular point and purpose.”14 Since traditions
are ‘socially embodied arguments’ that extend through many generations, the pursuit of
goods is not without debate and discourse. Every tradition is made up of a community,
institutional forms, and practices. The function of these social expressions is to preserve
and pass along the goods of a tradition to an individual. Along with the overriding good,
a tradition also delivers “a conception of a truth beyond and ordering all particular
truths.”15 This observation is essential to our conception of a natural law tradition.
MacIntyre’s conception of a higher truth or constitutive truth ‘ordering all particular
truths’ and an overriding good is the framework for understanding the rationality of a
natural law tradition.
In this model, an overriding good may be equivalent with the constitutive truth of
a tradition. That is the case with the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, where the
overriding good that is also the constitutive truth, is designated as Dhamma and God. The
Dhammapada (Path of Truth), for example, describes the Buddha’s true Teaching
(Dhamma) as a flavor that “excels all other flavors” and a delight that “surpasses all
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delights” (Dh v. 354). This metaphorical language here equates the truth with a supreme
good beyond the qualities of taste and pleasure. Similarly, St. Thomas’s Christian
metaphysics claims that the “true and good are appropriated to God” (DQTruth 1).
Truth, according to MacIntyre’s concept of tradition, is the measure of our warrants—the
reasonable grounds for some act.16 In our traditions in question, Dhamma and God, as
both the constitutive truth and the overriding good, establish the standards of rationality.
When it comes to a single human agent, each tradition also identifies a hypergood as the
aim of religious practice.17 Perfect happiness (beatitudo perfecta) attained in heaven for
Aquinas and the “blowing out” (nibbāna) of desire that is enlightenment for the Buddha
both qualify as hypergoods. This theme will receive further exploration in chapter 4.
Natural law thinking and reasoning in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions is
thereby constituted by a higher truth that is also construed as a higher law ordering all
particular moral judgments of the human agent. The truth providing the standard is
synonymous with the law providing the measure for all human acts. Our work in the next
section should demonstrate this congruence between the constitutive truth and the higher
law in the natural law traditions. Let us now consider the work of David Novak who uses
a similar notion of tradition known as historical community that attempts to preserve the
value of religious truths and revelations within a democratic political context. It should
assist us in refining our concept of a natural law tradition that is sensitive to the modern
secular outlook.
16
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The hermeneutical standpoint of David Novak’s thinking is secular democratic
societies. His argument is that these modern societies should be viewed by citizens as
secondary to historical communities, which should be primary. A historical community is
a singular and traditional community that precedes the existing temporal order and is
rooted in revelation or religiously constituted. He observes, “I know of no historically
transmitted culture that when probed deeply enough does not invoke some transcendent
reality as its source.”18 Therefore, he interprets a religious concept such as revelation as a
“historical phenomenon.”19
Novak’s concern is that without a concept of historical communities to ground
secular democratic society, the ideas of social contracts and human rights are artificial
and without substance. That is because these ideas were founded on a fictional view of
society as an agreement made up by self-constituted individuals coming together from a
“state of nature.”20 The social contract “presupposes that its parties come to it with rights
that are their already,” with those prior rights originating in historical communities.21 In
the Jewish tradition, the idea of covenant precedes and grounds all other social, legal, and
political contracts. Covenants thus serve as the foundation for contracts from a Jewish
perspective.22
Historical communities, in his view, are seen as external authorities because they
not only historically precede the current order but also because they derive their authority
from a transcendent source. Although I have some reservation about what kinds of
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traditions might actually be considered historical communities according to Novak,23 his
reflection can nonetheless guide us in formulating a concept of a natural law tradition.
We can see a similarity between what I am calling higher law and a constitutive
truth in MacIntyre’s concept of tradition and Novak’s idea of covenant as a religious
foundation rooted in a transcendent source that orders all particular or temporal contracts.
The common theme in their accounts is that tradition and historical communities are
constituted by an order and truth that is higher than this particular existence. Whereas
MacIntyre stops short as a social and moral philosopher in discussing what the higher
truth might be, Novak as a theologian identifies it as God’s Law.
Indebted to the Hebrew Scriptures, rabbinic theology, and Jewish legal tradition,
Novak develops an account of natural law with public relevance. He defines natural law
in Judaism as a “border concept” between theology and philosophy and between other
traditions in the following way:
On the surface, it functions like the idea of natural rights, that is, it proposes rules,
procedures, and even principles for the governance of civil society. But unlike the
idea of human rights it does not claim to be self-constituting. By its real assertion
of nature, it indicates that it is rooted in an order that transcends any imminent
society.24
In the preceding passage, we can isolate the two dimensions required for a natural
law theory according to Novak: the comparative and the ontological.25 The former
dimension illustrates that an account of natural law must seek commonalities across
traditions, hence engaging in the comparative task. This is why Novak says, “natural law
functions as a bridge between cultures, preventing any of them from cornering the market
23
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on humankind and humanity.”26 For Judaism, Novak argues that the Noahide law given
as a universal law for mankind represents a Scriptural account of the natural law.
Therefore, Scripture serves as the foundation for natural law thinking. This interpretation
overcomes the possibility of Enlightenment universalism or totalism that attempts to
explain the morality of all diverse cultures in terms of a transcendental viewpoint that has
been achieved by a single ethical theory.27 A natural law tradition does not claim to offer
a detailed explanation of other moralities. Instead, it offers a “universal horizon” from
which it includes other moral traditions and claims at least to have a minimum in
common with other traditions.28 Natural law thinking doesn’t attempt to establish a
universal morality but instead recognizes the dignity of difference as a precondition for
the gift of revelation or insight. Its purpose, in our investigation, is to open up a mode of
discourse with other traditions to illuminate overlapping moralities and identify moral
divergences. Thus the comparative dimension of natural law thinking transcends cultures
by locating both its similarities and differences with other traditions.
The ontological dimension demonstrates that natural law accounts must be
conversant with both theology and philosophy, in order to formulate a cogent account of
human nature. Philosophical thinking moves from ethics up to ontology, whereas
theology is the reverse from ontology up to ethics.29 Regardless, the two shall meet
somewhere thereby making the reflection on “nature” a normative endeavor necessary for
natural law. Thinking about law without nature would amount to “law without discernible
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reason,”30 perhaps conjuring up an image of an irrational God or a totalitarian state that
deprives basic dignity to others. These ontological and comparative dimensions of
Novak’s natural law account shall guide our investigation of the Theravāda and
Thomistic traditions. They coincide with the metaethical and fundamental dimensions,
and the overall comparative task of our multidimensional approach.
If revelation is a ‘historical phenomenon’ for Novak, then it should be no surprise
that he interprets natural law as a “cultural construct.” We have already seen how his
conception of historical communities allows for a cultural construct like natural law to
still carry weight in public discourse. A cultural construct, in his view, does not have the
same meaning as ‘human constructs’ such as human rights or the social contract.
Interpreting natural law as a cultural construct is consistent with our attempt to formulate
a concept of a natural law tradition that can designate its importance in public discourse
and limits as well. He notes that, “the greatest vulnerability to natural law theory… is its
seeming oblivion to and disrespect of cultural diversity, especially in normative
matters.”31 Aristotle and Plato, for example, were guilty of the classicist worldview we
noted earlier in their presupposition that Greek thought and culture spoke for humanity as
a whole. The Hellenistic military campaigns of Alexander the Great, a student of
Aristotle, attest to this.
Novak’s response to this vulnerability is to historicize natural law by identifying
the revelation upon which it is legitimated (i.e., the Torah) as a historical phenomenon. In
this way, he overcomes the vulnerability of a classicist worldview that premoderns and
moderns alike have been prey. A historical community with a natural law vocabulary is
30
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but one community among a plurality of others participating in a democratic ethos. With
this vulnerability in mind, we can agree with Novak to an extent that “metaphysics is not
the way to constitute natural law.”32
What Novak wants to avoid, and rightfully so, is an account of natural theology or
metaphysical biology that designates a specific community’s revelation or philosophical
anthropology as a self-evident truth binding on everyone. Novak claims that his
ontological account of human beings is derived not from metaphysics, but from the
doctrine of creation. Since creation of the world precedes the historical revelation to the
Jewish community at Sinai, it “does not allow any member of the covenanted community
to ignore the world beyond the community facing her.”33 This might be a faithful move in
Judaism but not for the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. To wholly ignore the
metaphysical and cosmological underpinnings of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions
or simply dismiss it as premodern would not be keeping to our ethical and religious aim.
The accounts of natural law in these traditions cannot be detached from
metaphysics and cosmology because it is central to the metaethical theories of these
traditions. Therefore, as we noted, metaphysics and cosmology better serve us as
heuristic devices secondary to the fundamental dimension of ethics and ontology. As
heuristic devices they are quite helpful in locating the place and significance of people
outside the tradition. In other words, considering the natural law from within the
cosmological and metaphysical worldviews of these traditions will assist us in analyzing
the comparative and ontological dimensions of the natural law. It will also illustrate how
these traditions pursue ultimate truth.
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Like Rabbinic Judaism, the Thomistic metaphysics of participation also rests
upon the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, while the Theravādin cosmology of
interdependence is understood in terms of the doctrine of dependent origination (patticasamuppāda). It is from these cosmological and metaphysical worldviews that these
natural law traditions pursue the question of constitutive truth. The standards of
rationality are determined by the truth that structures the metaphysical or cosmological
order in the natural law tradition. To heed Novak’s warning of metaphysics and natural
theology, these doctrines or truths should be viewed as a special revelation or special
insight and interpreted as historical phenomena. Therefore, in the traditions in question,
the special revelation of God achieving normative expression in Scripture and the special
insight of the Buddha having normative expression in the Pāli Canon, are the ways of
constituting natural law. But, of equal importance, is the comparative dimension of
illuminating natural law by seeking commonalities with other traditions.
Natural Law Traditions
The concept of a natural law tradition we have been formulating according to the
works of MacIntyre and Novak should now be evident. Their accounts contain three
primary characteristics for a natural law tradition that I am conceptualizing: rationality as
tradition-constituted; revelation as a historical phenomenon; and natural law as a cultural
construct that is both comparative and ontological. These characteristics reflect the
historical turn in contemporary ethical thought, but do so without abandoning the
concepts of higher law and constitutive truth. Their notions of tradition and historical
community offer us a working model that is amendable to the natural law traditions in
36

question and compatible to our hermeneutical standpoint. This model is conducive to our
natural law traditions in that it allows for illumination or shared insight between
traditions and recognizes the limits and possibilities of democratic participation for these
natural law traditions.
Since our hermeneutical standpoint is framed within the global context of moral
diversity and pluralism, an account must be given of how the natural law traditions can
respond. My claim is that these natural law traditions thrive on discourse about moral
truths with other traditions while continuing to pursue ultimate truth claims within their
own metaphysical or cosmological worldviews. These traditions aim to discover shared
insights and mutual illumination with discourse partners. But they do so without positing
moral authoritarianism. The intent is never to proselytize because natural law traditions
recognize the autonomy of other traditions. Natural law traditions respect the brute fact of
moral differences and begin from this premise.
Dhamma in the Theravāda Tradition
The Theravāda, or “Way of the Elders” tradition, refers to the most ancient school
of Buddhism in existence today whose textual authority is derived from the Pāli Canon.
This tradition is geographically situated in the Southeast Asian countries of Thailand, Sri
Lanka, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The origin of what we call Buddhism as a religious
tradition is attributed to Tathāgata Buddha, born as Prince Siddhartha Gotama (563-483
BCE).

Having spent his life in the confines of a palace environment amidst worldly

pleasures and wholly ignorant of the outside world, Gotama’s experience of the “passing
sights” outside the palace sent him into a whirlwind of confusion and sadness. The three
37

encounters of an old man, a sick man, and a corpse exposed the prince to the existence of
suffering (dukkha) and the impermanence (anicca) of life. But it was his encounter with
an ascetic monk in pursuit of the truth that attracted him to an alternative lifestyle that
hinted at a solution to the problems to aging, sickness, and death. Toward the end of his
life, the Buddha himself recounted to a student what followed: “When I was twenty-nine,
Subhadda, I left home to seek the greatest good. Now more than fifty years have passed,
Subhadda, since I renounced the world.”34
Gotama renounced his royal lifestyle leaving behind his wife and child, which
was accepted in the context of classical Indian society. For six years, Gotama studied
various dharma through meditative concentration (samādhi) and other spiritual practices
with different teachers, but none of these teachings left him satisfied. He then discovered
his own path toward an enlightened state. It occurred one day sitting under the Bodhi tree
while he was recovering from his ascetic and emaciated condition. During this
experience, the Buddha had direct insight into the true nature of things and achieved
enlightenment (nibbāna). He decided to return to the world out of compassion to preach
the Dhamma, or Teaching.35 In the first discourse of his enlightened state, the Deer Park
Sermon, Gotama Buddha, “the Awakened One,” taught the Dhamma as the middle way
between austerity and worldly pleasure. The solution lay in the Noble Eightfold Path that
leads to the cessation (nirodha) of suffering.36
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The Dhamma preached by the Buddha has a variety of translations in the
Theravāda tradition including “holy wisdom, salvific truth, teaching, and doctrine.”37
According to the scholastic Abhidhamma literature that developed a couple of centuries
after the Buddha’s final death (parinibbāna), dhammā38 or “existents,” refer to separately
existing objects of consciousness that can be accessed or penetrated by the trained
mind.39 In the Theravāda tradition both Dhamma/dhammā refer to a singular reality of
interdependence that the practitioner can experience through insight.40
To designate Theravāda Buddhism as a natural law tradition we must focus on the
ethical, ontological, and cosmological implications of Dhamma. I am not attempting to
articulate a new area of inquiry here but drawing upon the work of Western scholars in
Buddhist ethics. My account of Dhamma as “natural law” is indebted primarily to the
works of Sallie King, Damien Keown, and Joanna Macy. The obvious challenge in
designating Theravāda Buddhism as a natural law tradition is that the term “natural law”
already contains the Western bias of monotheistic natural law traditions such as Novak’s
Judaism and Thomism. The proliferation of this term in other traditions that function in a
similar yet unique way other than the monotheistic accounts belongs to my task. As a
starting point, let us consider Keown’s definition of the term:
Dharma may be translated as “natural law,” a term which captures both its
important meanings, namely as the principle of order and regularity seen in the
behavior of natural phenomena, and also the idea of a universal moral law whose
requirements have been discovered (not invented) by enlightened beings such as
the Buddha.41
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From this definition, the inextricability of natural phenomena and moral law is
presented thus demonstrating the importance of having an account of nature available to
address the question of Buddhist ethics. Keown also notes another significant point, that
the Buddha “discovered” the Dhamma. Therefore, the truth of this teaching preexists the
life and death of the “thus come, thus gone” Buddha. The Dhamma as natural law and
truth is objective and independent of anyone’s awareness. Thus it meets our criterion of a
constitutive truth: “Whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or no arising of Tathāgatas,
that element still persists [dependent origination], the stableness of Dhamma, the fixed
course of Dhamma, specific conditionality” (SN 12:20; II 25-27).42
Although some Western scholars of Buddhist ethics have identified Dhamma as
natural law, two Thai Theravāda monk-scholars have used this terminology extensively
in their teaching, Phra Prayudh Payutto and the late Bhikkhu Buddhadasa.43 Their work is
concerned primarily with the ethical, spiritual, and social implications of Dhamma. The
moral discipline of proper conduct (sīla), the virtue of compassion (karuna), the spiritual
practice of meditation (samādhi), and the achievement of a just society are all the direct
result of humans acting in accord with the laws of nature. In the model of natural law
shared by both Payutto and Buddhadasa, the “ought” of moral behavior is derived from
what “is” the case in nature.44 Let us consider some of the basic tenets of Buddhist ethics
from a natural law perspective.
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The Eightfold Path that leads to enlightenment follows a tripartite structure of
moral discipline, meditation, and insight. Although these general divisions of the path are
not hierarchically set, of these, sīla has been considered “the basis of all good qualities”
(Mil II.1.9). Often cited as the fundamental teaching for moral discipline in Buddhism is
this verse from the Dhammapada: “To avoid all evil, to cultivate good deeds, and to
purify one’s mind—this is the teaching of the Buddhas” (Dh 183). The teaching, which
has been called the heart of Buddhism,45 is strikingly similar to the primary precept of the
natural law according to Aquinas.
What is unclear from this teaching is the content of evil and good deeds. The
Theravāda tradition contains a rich language of perspicuous contrast for evil and good
acts with terminology like unwholesome and wholesome, unskillful and skillful. The Five
Precepts (pañca-sila), identified as the minimum lay obligations, are unwholesome acts
that require abstention from everyone. They include the abandonment of killing, stealing,
sexual misconduct, false speech, and intoxication. The precepts are not commands of the
natural light of reason that originates in a divine lawgiver which compels action as
Aquinas will describe it. They are purely rational responses to the natural order.
According to Payutto, they are the “first step” toward avoiding evil or unskillful actions
that are derived solely from “reason and natural laws.”46 This would confirm the
Buddha’s perspective that these are ancient, traditional, and unadulterated precepts that
people of other traditions deem beneficial as well (AN 8:39; IV 245-47). Therefore, the
precepts are reasonable in the sense that the common moral agent is capable of
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understanding its worth through a partial understanding of the natural law. These moral
precepts are “a universal set of objective principles established in accordance with natural
truths” that are observable to all persons.47
With regard to sīla, observing the natural law or truth of kamma—the process
determining the cause and effect between all relationships—is the key to moral
development. That is because kamma determines the proper consequences, whether
retributive or rewarding, based on the agent’s actions. The Buddha defines kamma simply
as those actions issuing from cetanā, translated as “intention” or “volition” (AN III 415).
Persons marked by extraordinary insight or wisdom (pañña) are capable of perceiving
those laws of nature that are more difficult. The Theravāda tradition distinguishes
between those who are only observing the law of kamma (kiriyavāda) and those who are
able to penetrate the higher Dhamma that is more difficult to perceive. The Buddha
himself used the terms worldly or mundane (lokiya) and world-transcending or
supramundane (lokuttara) to designate this difference.48 This distinction between levels
of awareness of the Dhamma will assist us in formulating the general and special
categories of natural law discourse in Theravāda Buddhism.
Having defined the law of kamma as part of the natural law, let us now consider
the truths of existence and the law that require deeper insight. There are two dhammic
principles that were taught by the Buddha according to Payutto. The first principle is the
“three characteristics of existence” (tilakkhana) that include suffering, impermanence,
and not-self (anattā). With regard to these characteristics, suffering and impermanence
are truths able to be penetrated by worldly or mundane realization. The other principle is
47
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dependent origination or dependent co-arising (pattica-samuppāda).49 This law, is the
most difficult to perceive but when realized opens the door to understanding the truth of
not-self. Even though distinctions are made between these principles, they all belong to
the same reality. As Payutto puts it, “they are presented in different ways in order to
reveal the same truth.”50
The natural law in Theravāda Buddhism is therefore observable to everyone
according to his or her moral and spiritual attunement with nature that is perfected
through the Eightfold Path. From this starting point, we have a working model for a
Theravāda natural law tradition with Dhamma as the constitutive truth. Let us now turn to
the concept of natural law in the Thomistic tradition which is understood in a theistic
framework instead of a naturalistic one.
Natural Law in the Thomistic Tradition
Friar Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 CE) of the Order of Preachers lived during a
vibrant era of western Christian Europe. The son of a count, Thomas was sent off to a
monastery at Monte Cassino to receive higher learning from clergy to meet the demands
of the boy’s exceptional aptitude. Thomas then went to study in the liberal setting at the
University of Naples, reading works from Oxford thinkers, Arab Muslims, and that
dangerous pagan philosopher, Aristotle.51 At the disapproval of his parents who had great
political and ecclesiastical aspirations for their son, Thomas grew deeply fond of the
simple mendicant lifestyle of the Dominicans and decided to embark for Paris to join the
order. Hearing word of this and angered by their son’s decision to live this way,
49
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Thomas’s own family kidnapped him and held him captive at a castle estate. The only
company he had was a couple of works by Aristotle and the Bible. Although a strange
pair of reading materials in Aquinas’s medieval Christendom, the confluence of both in
his thinking would transform his theological reflection into the writings of an “Angelic
Doctor.” After two years, he was finally able to leave the fortress whereupon he joined
the academic community at the University of Paris and studied under the tutelage of
Albertus Magnus. Paris was precisely the kind of environment Thomas could engage in
public debates with theological masters like St. Bonaventure. In these discourses, Thomas
argued from a more liberal-minded Aristotelian viewpoint while the conservative
Franciscan Bonaventure attempted to guard the traditional faith from unwelcome pagan
philosophy.
In mapping the emergence of the Thomistic tradition, MacIntyre convincingly
shows what Aquinas reckoned with in his theological reflection: “two rival, incompatible
and apparently incommensurable traditions.”52 These were of course the Aristotelian and
the Augustinian traditions. But Thomas succeeded in synthesizing these two seemingly
incompatible traditions. In simple terms, the unified system of thought between Aristotle
and Augustine is captured in Aquinas’s famous dictum, “grace does not abolish nature,
but completes it” (ST 1a 1.8).53 Here lies the formula for understanding the role that grace
has for nature, theology for philosophy, faith for reason, and divine law for natural law.
Aquinas claimed that Aristotle provided a philosophy proper to man’s natural
capacities but he believed that humans have a supernatural vocation that only theology
can disclose. “God is the ultimate end of man” and it is only in the attainment of this
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ultimate end that perfect happiness (beatitudo perfecta) consists (ST 1a2ae 1.6). But
“perfect happiness cannot be had by man in the present state of life,” therefore, it must
consist in the afterlife because that is the promise of sacred Scripture (ST 1a2ae 3.2).
Unlike Aristotle, who said that true happiness (eudaimonia) consisted in the intellectual
activity of contemplation (theoria) afforded by natural reason, Aquinas believed that
happiness “especially lies… in contemplation of the divine,” afforded by the infused
grace of the supernatural virtues of faith and charity (ST 1a2ae 3.5). Again, returning to
the Thomistic formula of grace perfecting nature, so too does faith perfect reason, and
theology perfect philosophy. The same goes for his model of divine law perfecting
natural law. In his own words, “just as grace presupposes nature, so it is right that the
divine law should presuppose the natural law” (ST 1a2ae 99.2). He uses the term
“superaddens” here to illustrate the notion of grace building on nature and the divine law
building on the natural law.
According to Thomistic anthropology, humans are made imago dei, bearing the
analogous imprints of God’s intellect and reason (ST 1a2ae, prologue).54 Because these
natural capacities have been created by a supernatural agent, namely God, humans are
endowed with the “light of natural reason.” Aquinas defines this natural capacity in the
following way: “the light of natural reason (lumen rationis naturalis), by which we
discern what is good and what is evil—which pertains to the natural law—is nothing
other than an impression in us of the divine light” (ST 1a2ae 91.2).
Reason (ratio), therefore, impressed by the divine light, is that which contains the
capacity to discern what is good and what is evil. This is, in the simplest manner,
54
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Aquinas’s definition of the natural law (lex naturalis). The fundamental habit that
“secures us accessibility to notions of good and evil” is synderesis.55 This natural habit of
synderesis, according to Aquinas, “is said to be the law of our intellect” because it
“contains the precepts of the natural law which are the first principles (prima principia)
of human acts” (ST 1a2ae 94.1 ad3). The primary precept that is grasped by synderesis
from which reasoning proceeds is this: “That good should be done and pursued and evil
avoided (bonum est faciendum et prosquendum, et malum vitandum) (ST 1a2ae 94.2).
The first principles of rational human agency include generally known principles such as
‘do no harm’ and ‘give every man his due.’
Aquinas understands humans to have a natural desire (inclinatione) toward the
good. Practical reason, which also naturally apprehends the good, works in tandem with
desire toward certain ends that define the common good (bonum commune): preservation
of life, sexual intercourse and education, religious truth and social living (Ibid.). The
primary precept or principium and the first principles that provide the reasonable starting
points for pursuing the common good listed above are universally known or understood
as self-evident truths (per se nota). As Aquinas puts it, “these belong to the law of nature
absolutely” (ST 1a2ae 100, my emphasis). Knowing the wrongness of these acts can
never be abolished from the human heart since it has been written in the human heart
independent of special revelation (ST 1a2ae 94.6 r3).
There are secondary precepts as well, which “are like detailed conclusions drawn
from first principles” (ST 1a2ae 94.5 r3). These precepts illustrate the movement from the
general knowable principles that guide practical reasoning to the particular conclusions.
55

Pamela M. Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 30.

46

The secondary precepts allow for the contingency of communities, experience, and
human weakness to shape them. This is where the activity of virtues like prudence
(prudentia) is essential. Synderesis may secure “the starting point,” but the virtue of
prudence aims at “the particular conclusions that can guide action.”56 In Aquinas’s
account, practical reason is a “rule and measure” containing the law of the intellect (ST
1a2ae 90.1).
The moral precepts are considered external principles of human action.57 They
originate in God’s act of creation, unlike the Five Precepts of Theravāda Buddhism that
are natural responses derived purely from a cosmological account of nature independent
of a deity. On the other hand, the virtues, as internal dispositions toward action, complete
practical reason and “enable it to make correct judgments about the human good in
particular contexts” (DQVirtGen a6). The role of virtues, therefore, in any natural law
account is essential. The possibility of embodying certain virtues is contingent upon what
law the moral agent is able to understand and follow.
The divine law refers to God’s twofold (duplicem) revelation in the Old Law and
the New Law (ST 1a2ae 91.5 r3). The Old Law refers to the revelation of God given to
the Jews in the Old Testament to instruct them about the natural law. The New Law is the
Gospel of Christ that fulfills the Old Law through the work of charity and grace. In the
Thomistic account, the natural law and its precepts “provide the necessary anchor for
practical reasoning” that “must rest on ends”58 the content of which only the divine law
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can truly reveal. Synderesis grasps the first principles of rational moral agency, but it
“does not provide content for our moral deliberations.”59 We noted that because humans
have a supernatural vocation, they need the gift of faith to understand their true end of
eternal happiness, attained in God. The natural law alone “does not suffice to order us to
God.”60 Therefore, the revelation of divine law is “necessary for the direction of human
life” because only God can satisfy human longing (ST 1a2ae 91.4). Still, both of these
kinds of law, the natural and the divine, derive from a single source—the eternal law.
For Aquinas, the natural law is said to be “nothing other than a participation in the
eternal law by the rational creature” (ST 1a2ae 91.2). In fact, both the natural law and
divine law participate in the eternal law. The eternal law is God’s Providence,
understood by Aquinas as the idea in Divine wisdom (divinae sapientiae) that directs all
acts and movements (ST 1a2ae 93.1). A rational creature (rationalis creatura) thus
participates in the eternal law “by providing for itself and others” (ST 1a2ae 91.2). This
relationship between the natural law and divine law sharing in the eternal law illustrates
the model of Aquinas’s metaphysics of participation.
To illustrate this relationship and to support my argument about truth construed as
law in natural law traditions, let us consider the following statement by St. Thomas: “For
all knowledge of the truth is an irradiation or participation (irradiatio et participatio) of
the eternal law which is the unchanging truth (veritas incommutabilis) (ST 1a2ae 93.2).”
Evident in this passage, Aquinas equates the eternal law with the unchanging truth. The
eternal law refers therefore to the very essence (essentia) of God. As such, I want to
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designate it as the constitutive truth of the Thomistic natural law tradition. It is a truth
that “no one can fully comprehend” because it precedes the creation of natural law and
extends beyond its limitations infinitely (Ibid.).
Authority in the Natural Law Traditions
The question of authority or sources, a facet of the normative dimension in our
approach, is central to our concept of a natural law tradition. Our hermeneutical
standpoint discourages deriving authority from a metaphysical or cosmological
worldview that is characteristic of premodern cultures. In other words, no account of
natural law should be taken merely on self-evident truths. What is self-evident in these
natural law traditions is always situated within the rationality of the tradition and its
attendant sources. That, of course, in no way implies that the natural law accounts should
be kept out of public discourse. This irruption of the natural law in public discourse,
because it is derived from a constitutive truth that is beyond measure, has no set limits on
human dignity and what it can challenge. In the next chapter I will illustrate how
reasonable claims to natural law can be made across traditions by way of normative
discourse.
In this section, I would like to consider the origin and proper locus of authority for
natural law in both traditions. Authority within traditions, according to MacIntyre, is
“conferred upon certain texts and certain voices.”61 Let us consider what these voices and
texts might be in the Theravada and Thomistic traditions. Locating natural law ethics
within the narrative context of sacred texts legitimated by an authoritative voice is a
characteristic of these traditions. This section will further illustrate the tradition61
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dependent rationality of these traditions, revelation or insight as a historical phenomenon,
and the claim that natural law is a cultural construct in Novak’s sense of the term.
Buddha, Pariyatti, and Pāli Canon
As noted, natural law in the Theravāda tradition is identified specifically with the
Dhamma, or the “Teaching,” of the Buddha. Unlike natural law in the Thomistic
tradition, which is an intrinsic quality of rational creatures, Dhamma in the Theravāda
tradition is the law of nature that constitutes all living things. It functions as the
constitutive truth and cosmic law in the Theravāda tradition whereas the eternal law (i.e.,
Divine wisdom) is the constitutive truth for Aquinas. Dhamma, as Payutto has noted, is
both natural truth and natural law. Therefore, it is not a supernatural reality like the
eternal law for Aquinas that no one, save God Himself, and the blessed in heaven, can
fully comprehend. In the Theravāda tradition, the figure of the Buddha and the arahant
refer to those awakened ones who have fully penetrated the Dhamma in this life by
achieving nibbāna (enlightenment).
As the constitutive truth and natural law, Dhamma “provides the measure against
which acts are judged, though each case is viewed as a response to the infinite variety of
circumstances” that confront the free choices made by persons.62 Dhamma, in the sense
we are using it, is the all-encompassing truth or the “cosmic principle of truth”63 about
the laws of reality that is to be penetrated through insight (paññā) and the spiritual
practice of vipassana-meditation. It is not a principle in the sense of mere propositions or
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abstractions. It is an experiential and empirical truth that is corporeal inasmuch as it is
cognitive. The following excerpt from the Pāli Suttas (or Discourses) of the Buddha
illustrates the embodied nature of Dhamma: “He who sees the Dhamma sees me, and he
who sees me sees the Dhamma” (SN III.120).64 The singularity of the Buddha and the
Dhamma serve as the authoritative nexus of the Theravāda tradition. Theravāda
practitioners pay homage to the Buddha for his “breakthrough” and “vision of the
Dhamma” and his compassion to return to society to teach the Noble Path (SN 13:1; II
133-34). Thus, it is his voice that preaches the Dhamma, and therefore his voice that is
granted authority because he has attained special insight.
Within the Theravāda tradition, the term pariyatti is used to designate the
“authoritative teaching” or the “words of the Buddha” pertaining to his insight into the
true Dhamma.65 According to commentarial tradition in Theravāda Buddhism, pariyatti
originally was in reference to the discourses “heard from the mouth of the Buddha and
passed down orally.”66 Therefore, its purpose was to designate the “official” spoken
Dhamma of the Buddha. Due to the Indian cultural context of Gotama Buddha, this task
of preserving the truth was necessary. We noted earlier that before his enlightenment,
Gotama tread various dharma for six years in order to discover the answer to the problem
of suffering and impermanence. During his quest, Gotama studied the different dharma
under teachers like Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta and on both occasions said,
“Not being satisfied with that dharma, disappointed with it, I left” (MN 26: I 160-67).
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Other religious paths were also available in this period that included the Brahmanical
tradition of Hinduism and the Jain followers of Mahāvīra.
This demonstrates that there were many meanings of dharma in the Buddha’s
context occasioned by the Hindu usage of that term. The word dharma is derived from the
Sanskrit root, dhr, meaning “to support,” or “to maintain.”67 In the Hindu worldview,
dharma refers to the structure regulating the cosmic, social, and moral orders that all
operate on different levels having different roles and expectations. In contrast to the
singularity of the Dhamma taught by the Buddha, Hindu dharma is a plurality. According
to one scholar, it “resists the application of categorical and universal laws.”68 That is not
to say that no attempts have been made in Hinduism to establish universal rules of
conduct. Consider, for example, the universal significance of ahimsā (non-harmfulness)
defined in the Mahābārata.69 But in the Indian imagination of the Buddha’s time,
conduct appropriate to one’s social position, gender, and age was the normative practice,
and it was expressed through the caste structure. This translates into various kinds of
dharma corresponding to caste or vocation (varnadharma), womanhood (strīdharma),
and stage in life (āśhramadharma).70 Therefore, identifying the authoritative teaching of
the Buddha’s insight in terms of pariyatti was central to the early followers to distinguish
it from other dharma.
Although there are a variety of meanings for Dhamma in Buddhism, we noted that
they all point to the singular reality of the truths and laws of nature: suffering,
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impermanence, no-self, kamma, and dependent origination. The law of kamma, which
regulates “natural justice,”71 produces pleasant or negative consequences based on an
agent’s intentional actions (cetanā) through mind, body, and speech (AN III.415). Yet its
effect is contingent upon whether or not the agent remains in the wheel of rebirth known
as samsāra. Earlier, I discussed the Buddha’s distinction between two levels of insight:
worldly (lokiya) and world-transcending (lokuttara). The enlightened Buddha, having
uprooted the fundamental twofold problem of craving (tanhā) and ignorance (avijjā), no
longer lived according to worldly samsāra and its characteristics of suffering and kamma.
This is the level of awareness that defines the world-transcending Buddhadhamma.
Pariyatti, as the authoritative teaching for the Buddhadhamma, required a
medium of expression. Originally, this might have referred to oral tradition. Evidence for
this claim is presented in the Dhammaññu Sutta, where the Buddha responds to a
disciple’s question about how a monk is one with a sense of Dhamma:
There is the case where a monk knows the Dhamma: dialogues, narratives of
mixed prose and verse, explanations, spontaneous exclamations, quotations, birth
stories, amazing events, questions and answer sessions… its because he knows
the Dhamma that he is said to be one with the Dhamma (AN 7.64 & IV.113).72
Knowing the Dhamma, according to this passage, is made possible through the
penetration of narrative and speech acts. This illustrates its location in oral authoritative
teaching and experiential learning. The term pariyatti eventually became synonymous
with “religious texts”73 and when rendered as pariyattidhamma, “it means dhamma that is
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be thoroughly learned, memorized, and remembered.”74 Its function was so crucial that,
according to Sinhalese commentary, the disappearance of the Buddhadhamma “will not
occur so long as pariyatti remains.”75 Two mediums of expression were therefore central
in extending pariyatti: the Pāli Canon and the Sangha.
The Buddha challenged the classical caste structure by establishing a social
institution according to the Dhamma known as the Sangha. This religious order was a
composite of monks (bhikkhus) and nuns (bhikkhunis).76 For many outcastes, women, and
members of the lower varnas, the Sangha offered a religious refuge and community of
liberation hitherto unavailable. Its purpose was so crucial in Buddhist life that taking
refuge in the Sangha was identified as part of the Triple Gem (tiratna), along with the
Buddha and the Dhamma. The Sangha was always situated within the larger Buddhist
community of lay followers. Monks and nuns required different observances than one
another, and both had more codes than the laity. This dual structure of monastic and lay
lifestyles embedded itself in the Buddhist social imaginary and translated, to some
degree, into two ways of comporting to existence: the way of pleasurable rebirth
(kamma) and the way of nibbāna. Both lifestyles were dependent on each other: the
monks and nuns offered training and education in the Dhamma, and the laity exercised
the public virtue of generosity (dāna) to sustain the Sangha and acquire merit.
The Pāli Canon, or Tipitika, descended from a collection of ancient Theravāda
texts that were composed as early as 350 BCE.77 There are “Three Baskets” or divisions to
the canonical literature. The first two include the Suttas (Discourses of the Buddha) and
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the Vinaya monastic codes. Among the Discourses, the various Nikāyas contain over five
thousand individual sutras all pertaining to the Buddha’s pariyatti.78 The Vinaya texts
define the religious observances and moral precepts for monks and nuns, which include
the 227 rules of conduct known as the Pātimokkha. The last division, the Abhidhammic
scholastic treatises, was gathered approximately a century after the other two baskets.
These writings are an extrapolation of the Dhamma taught by the Buddha by emphasizing
the emptiness of all psychological and physical events with analytical rigor and technical
precision. The reification of the notion of Dhamma as a result of the teachings expanding
textually and institutionally is said to be one of the concerns that inspired this literature.79
Thus the Abhidhammic philosophy renders the Buddhist cosmology as a continuous
process of psycho-physical occurrences to refute the tendency of construing reality in
terms of ontological substances.
All of the canonical literature, especially the Suttas, represents the narrative
context of Dhamma in a way similar to Novak’s Scriptural foundation of natural law
ethics in Judaism. The true Dhamma, secured by pariyatti, and expounded in the Pāli
Canon and taught by the Sangha, is the experiential matrix of special insight into natural
law. This is important because it demonstrates the contextual setting of natural law and
the limits of its claims on others who have not received the “gift of Dhamma”
(dhammadānam) (Dh 354). In the next chapter, we will consider how the life story of the
Buddha in conjunction with his teachings illustrates the different levels of insight that can
serve as model for natural law discourse across traditions and within the Therāvada
tradition.
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God, Sacra Doctrina, and Scripture
We have already identified the eternal law in the Thomistic account as the
constitutive truth ordering all particular truths of which the natural law would consist.
The eternal law, as Divine wisdom, is the source of providential order for all creation that
aims to return creation to itself (ST 1a2ae 91.1). It is God who imprints the natural law in
creation through “the light of natural reason” and it is God who reveals the higher aim
(altiori modo) of man’s supernatural vocation within the fabric of creation by means of
the divine law (ST 1a2ae 91.4). In the Thomistic tradition, the natural law is the artifice of
God and thereby finds its resources within the context of theological reflection.
This has not been the position of proponents of the “new natural law theory” who
claim to uncover self-evident truths from pure practical reason’s grasp of “basic goods”
without turning to metaphysics.80 To their credit, these thinkers admit a departure from
the Thomistic tradition and it is evident in their disagreement with Aquinas on this point:
Human reason by itself is not the rule of things, but principles naturally instilled
in man are certain rules and measures of all things to be done by man, and of
these things natural reason is the rule and measures although it is not the measure
of things that come from nature (ST 1a2ae 91.3).
In other words, a concept of pure natural reason as the source of rule and measure is not
Aquinas’s claim. Rather, human reason, not “by itself,” but within the matrix of the
eternal law has its proper locus of authority. The eternal law therefore is the infinite
measure of the natural law. Such a claim secures the idea of an infinite measure of law
originating in the eternal law that can check the measure of any law.
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This brings us to Aquinas’s notion of human law (lex humana). As one scholar
puts it, human law is the “law of specific communities.”81 Human law works in tandem
with the natural law to extend its precepts, mainly through jurisprudence or legal
reasoning. But the issue now arises, what if a human law is unjust? I turn to Aquinas’s
point: “the law of the Holy Spirit is superior to every law humanly established” (ST 1a2ae
96.5 r2). As such, there is no better instruction of moral law than the teaching of God,
which is the basis of authority for natural law thinking in the Thomistic tradition. This is
why it can be said that Aquinas locates natural law in sacra doctrina, or “Divine
Teaching.”82
In the opening question of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas describes his major
work, which was never completed, as a science of sacra doctrina. He understands sacra
doctrina as a higher science “established on principles revealed by God” to complement
philosophical science for the sake of human salvation: “It was therefore necessary that
besides the philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science
learned through revelation” (ST 1.1-2) The aim of sacra doctrina is to demonstrate the
complementarity between faith and reason while maintaining the authority of revelation.
In the case of natural law, even though it belongs to all rational creatures and
contains precepts that are self-evident (per se nota), it requires the authority of sacra
doctrina from within the tradition to maintain its coherence and legitimacy. This goes for
all the precepts of the natural law. In other words, the natural law tradition of Aquinas
safeguards an account of an immutable natural moral law inherent in all human beings.
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Yet although the natural law participates in the eternal law, it is not necessary for the
natural law to participate in the divine law. That is because Aquinas grants Aristotle’s
account of the moral life a legitimate place within Divine Providence. The autonomy of
the natural law is evident in the Summa because it has a kind of permanent status in
nature that precedes the gift of grace: “grace (gratia) is more effective than nature, yet
nature is more essential to man, therefore, more permanent” (1a2ae 94.6 r2). As such,
those people exercising the natural law outside of the religious tradition are protected
from any possible religious authoritarianism masquerading as divine law because they are
still viewed as participants in the eternal law.
A Thomistic natural law tradition, in theory, approves and protects other
communities of rational persons that may be outside of the divine law. The sacra
doctrina is therefore the locus of authority for God’s voice in a living Thomistic natural
law tradition. Church leaders, theologians, and everyday saints, all contribute to this
living tradition by protecting the sanctity of the eternal law on earth as the following
excerpt from the Roman Catholic encyclical by Pope John Paul II shows:
Within Tradition, the authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law develops, with the
help of the Holy Spirit. The same Spirit who is at the origin of the Revelation of
Jesus’ commandments and teachings, guarantees that they will be reverently
preserved, faithfully expounded and correctly applied in different times and
places (VS § 27).
If sacra doctrina represents the authoritative teaching given by God—the voice—
in a living Thomistic natural law tradition, then Scripture would be the textual authority
of natural law. Some Christian ethicists like Stanley Hauerwas and Richard McCormick
claim that Scripture and natural law represent two distinct sources for ethical reflection.83
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For Aquinas, natural law and Scripture are inseparable. Thomas locates natural law in
sacra doctrina, of which Scripture is a most faithful guide, thereby illustrating the
narrative and divinely revealed context of natural law. Scripture, but also human scholars,
represent the auctoritates of Thomas’s concept of natural law.
The purpose of locating natural law in narrative for Aquinas is for argumentation
and evidence. I noted earlier that the divine law is expressed through the Biblical
narrative of the Old and New Laws or Testaments. This authority, originating in
revelation, is “decisive” over the authority granted to human authors such as “the
Philosopher” Aristotle and church fathers like Augustine and Jerome.84 So the particular
truth of the human auctoritas, of whom Aquinas may not always agree with, must be
measured against the constitutive truth of God’s word revealed in Scripture. The Biblical
narrative, and specifically the Pauline narrative in the Letter to the Romans, is “the
storied context in which Aquinas places assertions of natural law.”85 It is in this epistle of
St. Paul that the most authoritative claims for the natural law are made. Here are a couple
of examples:
Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible
though they are, have been understood and seen through the things that he has
made. [1:20]
When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do by nature (phusei) what the law
requires, these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves. They show
that what the law requires is written on their hearts, to which their own conscience
(syndeiseos) also bears witness; and their conflicting thoughts will accuse or
perhaps excuse them. [2:14-15]
In the second passage, I have italicized two words from the ancient Greek,
“nature” and “conscience,” to highlight the significance of Scripture for the authoritative
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basis of Aquinas’s view of natural law. The Greek term, synedeisos, functions as a
cognate of the Latin synderesis referring to a natural capacity for moral discernment.
These excerpts given in the context of Paul’s account of the historical fall of the Gentiles
into idolatry fits into Aquinas’s narrative account of the natural law that begins with the
Old Law and is completed with the New Law.86
The Law of Moses, according to Aquinas, although given as a divine law, was an
imperfect law in the sense that it only predisposed Jews to the arrival of Christ (ST 1a2ae
98.2). Its work was to teach humanity about the natural law and prefigure the Messiah.87
The supernatural vocation of humanity is then revealed in the work of Christ, the New
Law according to grace and charity, of which Paul is the main expositor. This is the basic
narrative of Aquinas’s Biblical account of natural law.
Locating the natural law within the sacra doctrina and its expression through the
narrative of Scripture, a move faithful to Aquinas, corresponds to our aim of identifying
natural law as a cultural construct. Novak’s model also gives credence to natural law
traditions by offering them a vital role within the functioning of a healthy democracy, a
theme that will conclude our investigation. It simultaneously places necessary limits on
the claims of natural law traditions since they exist as one among an entire network of
historical communities thus avoiding any possible authoritarianism. In the next section, I
consider how it is that these natural law traditions can engage in normative discourse with
other traditions in the hermeneutic project of mutual illumination or shared insight and
consider how it is that one can pursue the constitutive truth within one’s own tradition.
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Chapter Three: Natural Law Discourse
My argument at this point is that the natural law ethics of the Theravāda and
Thomistic traditions fit our concept of a natural law tradition formulated through the
work of Macintyre and Novak from our hermeneutical standpoint. I have attempted to
demonstrate this by focusing primarily on the normative dimension of our
multidimensional model. This led us to consider the authoritative basis and narrative
context in both traditions of natural law ethics to show they function as a cultural
construct. In this chapter, I focus on the comparative and ontological dimensions of
natural law ethics. My claim is that these natural law traditions contain analogous
structures for normative discourse that have the ability to bridge with other cultures and
traditions. Natural law must be located within the rationality of one tradition among many
so that it can avoid making totalistic claims. And this, I argue, is compatible with these
traditions anyway since they possess the conceptual resources for recognizing moral
diversity and the autonomy of other traditions. These natural law traditions are also able
to identify common moral claims and adjudicate moral differences across traditions to
avoid incommensurability.
In the Journal of Religious Ethics article, “Is Natural Law a Border Concept
between Judaism and Christianity?” David Novak compares the natural law ethics of
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Christianity and Judaism in order to find common ground between the traditions.1 He
claims that Christianity and Judaism “must locate an ethical border” around themselves
and then between each other and some third tradition.2 He appeals to the other Abrahamic
tradition, Islam, as a potential dialogue partner. To delineate the parameters of dialogue,
Novak designates two categories of normative natural law discourse that I will employ:
special and general.3 In Novak’s Jewish account, the former category refers to the special
revelation of Judaism, i.e., the Mosaic Law that establishes the Jewish people in history
as a community chosen by God. Speaking as a Jewish theologian, Novak says, “that
special revelation enables us to accept God as the immediate source of our communal
life.”4 The latter category refers to general revelation. I noted earlier that for Novak, this
designates the Noahide law that God established with all human beings. Discourse on the
level of general revelation is a minimalist account concerning the basic norms or ethical
commonality between traditions. It is a regulatory principle that “only offers rights, not
the good.”5 In other words, its aim is to shape the “overlapping consensus” among the
plurality of voices in the public sphere. General revelation thereby maintains the
important status of historical communities within the democratic ethos as a precondition
for justice to prevent religious traditions from being ‘kept at the doorstep’ by doctrinaire
secularists.6
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I believe that Novak has set the parameters for two modes of discourse in an
intriguing way among the monotheistic natural law traditions. But a shortcoming in his
work is that he limits this dialogue to monotheistic faiths. I have intended to address this
limitation in Novak by considering how a Buddhist natural law tradition might fit in these
categories of discourse and participate in the dialogue. Let us consider these categories in
more detail.
The special category is specifically aimed at discourse within the tradition and the
general category aimed at discourse across traditions. Broadly speaking, the special
category pertains specifically to “theological” claims whereas the general category is
concerned with ethical claims.7 Each mode of discourse therefore has a specific function
in the development of that tradition. But that does not exclude the possibility of
overlapping in these categories. For example, that God is the benevolent creator of the
world is a special revelation claim that all monotheistic traditions share and are able to
discuss. This is not properly the task of comparative religious ethics. As we explore this
normative dimension of discourse in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, I am using
the special category to refer specifically to the Buddhadhamma and the divine law.
The general category (or general knowledge), which isolates a language for
comparison with other traditions, refers to the kammic law in the Theravāda tradition and
the lex naturalis (natural law) in Aquinas. To be consistent with our traditions in
question, general knowledge and special revelation categories are assigned to the
Thomistic tradition whereas general knowledge and special insight categories are used
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for the Theravāda tradition. Within each tradition, the special and general categories of
natural law discourse are not separate. Both categories are dependent on the other. There
is no divine law without lex naturalis just as there is no realization of the Buddhadhamma
without having first realized the law of kamma and the suffering characterizing samsāra.
This truism secures the autonomy of other traditions. Conversely, lex naturalis requires
divine law for its supernatural fulfillment whereas kamma and suffering can only be
extinguished by penetrating the Buddhadhamma. Thus enlightenment takes place within
existence, or samsāra. Grace transforms nature in this world.
Lastly, I claim that these modes of natural law discourse can answer the two
challenges of relativism and perspectivism posed by the post-Enlightenment skepticism
of a genealogist such as Nietzsche. The relativist position denies “that rational debate
between and rational choice among rival traditions is possible.”8 Meanwhile, the
perspectivist outlook “puts in question the possibility of making any truth claims from
within any one tradition.”9 The normative discourse of natural law traditions are
structured in such a way that can meet these two challenges.
I argue that general discourse opens up a path of mutual illumination between
traditions thus demonstrating the reasonableness of moral claims across traditions.
General discourse locates what these traditions purport to have in common with other
religions and cultures thereby inviting the possibility of shared insight. It also allows the
possibility for moral divergence to surface that can lead to adjudication across traditions,
if need be. These factors can respond to the relativist challenge. On the other hand,
through special discourse with other practitioners of one’s home tradition or any other
8
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tradition sharing special claims, one can pursue the truth from within their particular
horizon. The special category designates the unique revelation or insight available to
religious practitioners regarding truth claims that is internally debated within the
tradition. It concerns more theological and speculative matters. As such, this mode of
discourse can respond to the perspectivist challenge.
General Category
Having a language of normative discourse between traditions on the level of
ethics is a crucial feature of natural law traditions and it is central to our method of
comparative ethical inquiry. I am claiming that this structural similarity in both the
Thomistic and Theravāda traditions can serve as a bridge with other cultures and as a
means for different religious traditions to join together on matters of shared insight,
especially in regard to ethical commonalities. This feature responds to the challenge
posed by the relativist claiming that no intelligible assessment or rational moral claims
can be made across cultures. These natural law traditions recognize that a certain level of
knowledge regarding the ultimate truth and higher law is available to all human beings by
virtue of their natural faculties. That kind of natural knowledge or natural wisdom is
possible because the constitutive truth is the basis of reality. Using the thought of Robert
Merrihew Adams, general knowledge denotes, “facts about life and the world that are
generally accessible to human beings, and through tendencies of belief and feeling that
are natural to human beings are at least widely and commonly present in people of
different places, times, and cultures.”10
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This is the parameter of general discourse for natural law traditions. I have
already suggested that each tradition uses a category for discriminating the special and
the general. For the Thomistic tradition, natural law (lex naturalis) in tandem with human
law illustrates the potential for common morality accessible to all rational persons. In the
Theravāda tradition, we have noted that observing the law of kamma, an aspect of
mundane (lokiya) awareness, is general knowledge available to all persons regardless of
dharma. In keeping with the claim that natural law is situated in a narrative context, we
will consider the narrative of Gotama Buddha’s life as recounted by the Pāli Canon and
also consider the interpretation of contemporary scholars. This can afford us a working
model for the categories of general knowledge and special insight within the Theravāda
tradition.
Law of Kamma
I noted earlier the observation made by Frank Reynolds that Theravāda Buddhism
has two cosmologies with distinct proximal aims: the samsaric cosmology aimed at
pleasurable rebirth and the Buddhic cosmology aimed at enlightenment.11 For the
Theravāda scholar Harvey Aronson, these distinctions translate into the kammic and
nibbanic paths. The two cosmologies and paths formulated by these scholars, which is
derived from the Pāli Canon and ethnography, provide the framework for delineating the
general and special modes of discourse in the Theravāda tradition. It is important to note
that for both scholars, the distinguishable cosmologies or paths are not fully separated so
as to define two different religions. This was an inaccuracy recorded by a number of

11

Reynolds and Schofer, 121-22.

66

anthropologists of Theravāda Buddhism who concluded that these separate paths are
expressed through the social institutions of the monastic and lay lifestyles.12
Instead, the mundane (lokiya) and supramundane (lokuttara) levels of reality
interpenetrate one another so that the two levels are “overlapping cosmologies.” As
Aronson puts it, “The mundane serves as the matrix for the transcendent.”13 Aronson
echoes, in a sense, Aquinas’s model of grace presupposing and transforming nature, by
pointing out that the nibbanic path of liberation from rebirth presupposes and transforms
the kammic path of ethical activity.14 The samsaric cosmology that is governed by the
law of kamma is by no means unique to the Theravāda tradition but is an appropriation of
ancient Hindu cosmology and ethics. According to Reynolds, the general knowledge of
this cosmology is echoed by the First Noble Truth of the Buddha: that all existence is
suffering.15 Samsāra is characterized by suffering or unsatisfactoriness, with the law of
kamma regulating the favorable or unfavorable outcomes and rebirths according to one’s
intentional actions.
Having noted the distinguishable but inseparable paths, it is the case that the
Buddha often associated the kammic path with the laity as is evident in the following
verse to a householder from the Anguttara Nikāya: “Four things lead to a family man’s
welfare and happiness in the future life. What four? Accomplishment in faith [in the
Buddha’s enlightenment], moral discipline, generosity (dāna), and wisdom” (8:54; IV
281-85). The first three of these qualities are virtues and precepts that characterize
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wholesome moral action. But the last quality, wisdom, should not be confused with the
wisdom or insight into “the true nature of things” achieved by the enlightened Buddha.
In this discourse Gotama Buddha is specifically referring to the wisdom attained
when a householder “sees the arising and passing away of phenomena” (Ibid.). It is this
level of knowledge, along with faith, morality, and generosity that can eventually lead to
the cessation of suffering, but proximally only leads to a pleasurable rebirth. The level of
reality for the householder is governed by kammic law, which belongs to the law of
nature, but does not encompass the fullness of Dhamma. The householder has attained
the “right view” (sammā ditthi) on the mundane (lokiya) level that is the source of
wholesome actions leading to fortunate rebirth.16 This level of kammic insight delineates
the mode of general discourse in the Theravāda tradition.
We can also locate this distinction between two levels of insight in the Buddha’s
retelling of his knowledge before and after enlightenment. In the following excerpt, he
states that he was aware of two out of the ‘three characteristics of existence’ (tilakkhana)
before nibbāna:
Before my enlightenment… it occurred to me: ‘Whatever pleasure and joy there is
in this world, this is the gratification in the world; that the world is impermanent
(anicca), bound up with suffering (dukkha), and subject to change, this is the
danger in the world; the removal and abandoning of desire (tanhā) and lust (rāga)
for the world, this is the escape from the world’ (AN 3:101 §§1-2; I 258-59).
The Buddha identified two characteristics—suffering and impermanence—that
led to his renunciation and search for the truth.17 This pursuit was triggered by his
experience of the passing sights of aging, disease, and death. His partial insight into the
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true Dhamma at this stage in his life demonstrates that this general knowledge can be
achieved as a householder, the stage he inhabited when he encountered the passing sights.
The Theravāda tradition makes no theoretical distinction between householders
who are Buddhists and non-Buddhist householders. Everyone belonging to this lifestyle
is capable of understanding this level of general insight into the Dhamma. That is not to
say that Theravāda Buddhist lay persons are restricted to this general insight. On the
contrary, the proliferation of insight-meditation among laity and the reinterpretation of
Sangha as a fourfold institution comprised of monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen attest
to this.18 Understanding the kammic law and the truths of impermanence and suffering
define the criteria of general knowledge available to all persons open to perception,
regardless of background. In support of this view, Buddhadasa suggested that all religions
should be able to avoid conflict and disagreement because they agree on the problem of
dukkha, the “central truth to humanity,” and are able to at least point to its solution in
Dhamma.19 In the next section, I shall consider how the Buddha’s special insight leading
to his enlightenment functions as the mode of special discourse.
Lex Naturalis
Locating the general and special modes of discourse in Aquinas’s thought poses
no challenge because of his synthesis of two seemingly incommensurable traditions. His
Aristotelian viewpoint, as well as Scriptural authority, shapes his sense of the natural law
(lex naturalis) residing in the faculty of reason. The natural law that is grasped by the
habit of synderesis and compelled by natural inclination is the starting point of general
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discourse from a Thomistic perspective. Aquinas recognized the autonomy of other
traditions early in his life. His exposure to Muslim thinkers in Naples and enjoyment of
Aristotle during his castigation showed him that natural reason transcended the
boundaries of traditions, religious or pagan. Although special discourse in terms of
trinitarian revelation was not possible with the tawhīd doctrine of Islam20 and the
philosopher’s impersonal god of metaphysics, general discourse on account of natural
reason was “not only possible but imperative.”21 For Aquinas, these other traditions
might lack the specific revelation that transforms nature, but there is no denying these
traditions their inherent dignity because the natural law participates in the eternal law.
Earlier, we considered the various dimensions of natural law. The primary precept
of ‘doing good, avoiding evil’ and the first principles of human acts like ‘do no harm’
and ‘respect property of others’ were known by nature absolutely and universally.
Natural law, at this level, cannot be abolished from human hearts. These fundamental
precepts of the natural law serve as a starting point for the moral life because they
provide direction toward the goods of human nature.22 I noted that Aquinas describes the
natural goods as the common good (bonum commune) that includes preservation of life,
sexual intercourse and education, religious truth and social living. The common good is
not merely pursued because natural reason commands it so. A moral agent pursues the
common good because she also has a natural inclination or desire that is an internal
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principle of action. Therefore, natural law is a twofold constitution of synderesis and
inclinationes.23 But this is not enough to attain what the natural law intends. Therefore,
natural law requires application to particular situations for the sake of obtaining natural
goods.
It is in this application that natural law finds its deeper expression and diversity
among communities. Application of the natural law in a general mode is the work of
human law and virtues. Human law, I referenced, is the law of specific communities, and
it provides the rules or general conclusions for natural law that can be applied to specific
circumstances. ‘Do no harm’ may be a first principle of moral agency, but human law
determines the particular rule that it is illegal to harm one’s own child. In Aquinas’s
thought, a human law is a secondary precept: “detailed… conclusions (quasi
conclusiones) following closely from the first principles” (ST 1a2ae 94.6). As such, this
type of precept allows for historical contingency and social customs to shape its
expression. Aquinas identifies three possible factors that can prevent secondary precepts
from extending the common good of the natural law: evil passions, depraved customs, or
corrupt habits (Ibid., r3). He uses the Roman example of legitimating theft and robbery as
described in Caesar’s Gallic Wars to explain this. The depraved customs prevented
Caesar’s army from clearly apprehending knowledge of the first principle of respecting
another’s property. Lacking a clear apprehension of the general principles of natural law
because of flawed customs and passions makes unjust actions possible. These unjust
actions can then find disordered expression in unjust human law.
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The true purpose of human law is to bring about the aim of natural law, which is
the common good of a society and regulate relations among society (ST 1a2ae 96.1).
Moreover, human law “intends to bring men to virtue,” but it can only do so in a limited
way because too many precepts might discourage imperfect people from civil stability
altogether (ST 1a2ae 96.2 r2). The social virtues that the human law can bring about in
society include justice and peace (ST 1a2ae 96.3). Essential to the application of
secondary precepts or human law to particular situations is the virtue of prudentia. It is a
virtue that “learns from the past and present about the future” (ST 2a2ae 47.1). Therefore,
it is a virtue that demonstrates that knowledge of the natural law is dynamic because it is
inextricably time-bound and historical.24 Prudence, located in reason, secures the right
means in a particular circumstance to draw one closer to the proper good. It is a virtue
that is necessary for the operation of all virtues, both natural ones and those supernatural
virtues infused by the grace of the Spirit.
Prudence qualifies as one of Aquinas’s natural or moral virtues available to all
moral agents possessing general knowledge of the natural law. And this is important
especially when one considers that “it is moral activity that is the door through which we
enter to reach the contemplation in which wisdom engages” (DQVirtGen 1 r4). Similar to
the Buddhist example of the mundane as the matrix for the supramundane, Aquinas views
moral agency guided by prudence as the door to contemplation and wisdom. Aquinas
never says that prudence or reason alone is sufficient because nature and reason need the
perfection of grace and revelation. But the natural law as a “participated theonomy” in
the eternal law shows that it is a precondition for the divine law, and therefore
24
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autonomous in this regard (VS §41). Were it not so, the Thomistic natural law tradition
embodied in the Roman Catholic Church today would not make the claim that other
religious traditions, which do not embrace revelation, “often reflect a ray of that Truth
which enlightens all men.”25
Special Category
In any tradition, discourse over truth claims or the goods which constitute it
belong to the very health of that tradition. For MacIntyre, “traditions, when vital, embody
continuities in conflict.”26 The debates in medieval Paris between Augustinians and the
rising Aristotelian thinkers is one such example. St. Bonaventure’s condemnation of
Aristotelianism and Siger de Brabant’s reluctant submission to orthodoxy over any kind
of philosophical challenge to theology attest to this in Aquinas’s period.27 This debate
and dialectic of seemingly incommensurable traditions is embodied in the writings of St.
Thomas. The argumentative technique of the Summa, of resolving conflicts between
competing auctoritas, belongs to the oeuvre’s brilliance and demonstrates the
“rationality” of the tradition. This highlights one of the crucial features of the Thomistic
tradition and tradition in general according to MacIntyre: “…certain radical
disagreements may be both recognized and rationally overcome within the context of any
kind of tradition.”28
The dialectical enterprise is the basis for the rationality of any tradition.
Moreover, “implicit in any rationality of such enquiry [e.g. Aquinas] there is indeed a
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conception of final truth.”29 A similar enterprise is reflected throughout the entire Pāli
Suttas, where the Buddha is constantly debating and discoursing with householders,
Brahmins, and monk disciples about the Dhamma. Within three centuries of the Buddha’s
death (parinibbāna), eighteen schools of sectarian Buddhism had already formed based
on doctrinal disputes.30
It is this vitality in the pursuit of truth and the good that counters the perspectivist
challenge and defines the purpose of special discourse. It often occurs through specific
theological disputes between believers having “explicit commitment in foundations.”31 In
other words, special discourse partners have some level of shared commitment to the
truth claims of a single religious tradition or sometimes across traditions as evident in
monotheistic traditions. The special insight or special revelation that occupies this mode
of discourse “will be known to most people only through a link of tradition or culture that
connects them with the original source.”32 Dhamma and God could therefore be defined
as the final or constitutive truths that link these natural law traditions to a transcendent
ground or unconditioned state. Special discourse in our natural law traditions is expressed
in the context of Buddhadhamma and divine law. Again, I turn to the Pāli narrative and
Theravāda scholars for delineating the Buddhadhamma. In the matter of Aquinas’s divine
law, we will consider more in depth his distinction between the Old Law and the New
Law. Not only does special discourse respond to the perspectivist challenge of pursuing
the truth, but it is also the context from which discussion about natural law in these
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traditions is framed. It also allows the possibility of extending the measure of human
dignity.
Buddhadhamma
The previous section on general discourse considered the law of kamma
regulating the wheel of rebirth as the general knowledge available to all perceptive
persons. This level of knowledge is often represented by the figure of the householder. I
turn attention now to the highest level of insight, the Buddhadhamma, which is associated
with Gotama Buddha and the arahant figure in the Pāli Canon. It receives this title
because it was the level of insight that was penetrated by the Buddha during his
enlightenment and later preached by him. The Buddhadhamma is the highest level of
insight because it leads to the cessation (nirodha) of suffering, the fundamental problem
of existence. It entails the complete vision of the Dhamma that is directly perceived when
one realizes the truth of dependent origination (pattica-samuppāda).33 Consider how the
Pāli Canon equates this doctrine with the fullness of Dhamma: “One who sees dependent
origination sees the Dhamma, and one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination”
(MN 28; I 190-91).
Dependent origination refers to the law that is the most “difficult to perceive” of
all conditioned phenomena: the arising and passing away of suffering by way of twelve
interdependent factors that characterize samsāra (SN 12:1; II 1-2). The first six factors
are associated with the arising of suffering and the last six are associated with the passing
away of suffering. The doctrine of pattica-samuppāda as taught by the Buddha identifies
ignorance (avijjā) as the primary factor through which all other factors arise in the wheel
33
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of rebirth. Yet ignorance is not a singular cause or source in the sense of linear causality.
Dependent origination illustrates the simultaneous arising of all phenomena, what Joanna
Macy has referred to as a “mutual causality.”34 This doctrine structures the Theravādin
cosmology of interdependence. The eventual uprooting of ignorance and all the other
factors through direct insight (paññā) into the true nature of things is the only way to
attain nibbāna.
It is through this awareness of pattica-samuppāda that the third characteristic of
existence, not-self (anattā), is fully understood. All phenomena, therefore, in light of this
doctrine of interdependent co-arising, lack eternal substance or being (svabhāva).35 The
human person, from this special insight, is comprised of five aggregates (khandhas) that
make up an individual during a given life. Upon death, the components of the single
person are disentangled and reintegrated with other components to comprise an entirely
new person without any essential properties. In this view of interdependent “empty”
persons, the Upanishadic doctrine of the permanent self (atman) is undermined.
Moreover, in light of this special insight, the natural law of kamma and the truths of
suffering and impermanence are revealed with the greatest of clarity and depth.
We noted that the Buddha’s distinction between levels of insight or awareness
into the Dhamma by referring to the mundane (lokiya) and the supramundane (lokuttara).
The mundane or worldly level refers to actions, virtues, and meditations that can produce
only pleasurable results and merit (puñña). The supramundane level, or worldtranscending path, refers to nine dimensions that lead to enlightenment: four paths
(magga), four fruits of those paths (phala), and nibbāna. In the context of the
34
35

See Macy, Chapters 1 and 2.
Fasching and deChant, 141.

76

Buddhadhamma, these levels of awareness disappear because one’s direct realization of
the fullness of Dhamma illuminates all other truths about reality.
The ethical implications of special insight of Buddhadhamma are transformative.
When the practitioner is in the proximity of nibbāna, she can truly behave in accord with
the Dhamma and have a deeper engagement with the cessation of suffering for all living
things.36 This higher insight, according to Reynolds, is framed within a Buddhic
cosmology: “Ignorance is overcome by wisdom, craving is replaced by compassion, and
the ongoing experience of suffering and impermanence gives way to liberation.”37
Seeking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, those on the way to enlightenment
in this life devote themselves to the Eightfold Path to extinguish kamma and achieve the
liberation that is enlightenment.
Divine Law
As a result of the effects of sin on the natural law and its expression in bad
customs, vices, and unjust human law, St. Thomas believed that God revealed the divine
law (lex divina) in order to repair and transform the human heart. Therefore, the natural
law is fully contained in the divine law. No discrepancy or incongruence exists between
the two. Aquinas gives four reasons why this divine law was necessary (ST 1a2ae 91.4).
The first reason is that humans have a supernatural vocation or ultimate end of eternal
happiness (finem beatudinis aeternae) that only God can direct. Second, because of moral
diversity, God offers a way of knowing what is good and what to avoid “without any
doubt at all.” The third reason is that although human law intends to cultivate some
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virtues, it is insufficient for cultivating all virtues, especially private ones. Finally, the
divine law prevents any sin or evil deeds from going unnoticed and unpunished.
Since the natural law only establishes general principles evident to everyone, the
divine law was given to direct in “certain detailed matters” (ST 1a2ae 91.5 r3). Therefore,
it is like human law, in the sense that it applies the general principles of the natural law to
particular circumstances. The fundamental difference between human law and divine law
has to do with teleological orientation. Whereas the end of human law is “that the State
shall have tranquility in its temporal affairs,” the end of divine law is eternal happiness
(ST 1a2ae 98.1).
The divine law and its precepts that orient one toward this supernatural end are, as
we mentioned, twofold. The twofold revelation of the divine law, for Aquinas, is
analogous to the development from childhood to adulthood. The Old Law (lex vetus)
given to the Jewish people, functions pedagogically to instruct the natural law. In this
regard, it is like human law because it functions as an external principle of action. The
moral precepts of the Old Law written in the Decalogue are in accord with reason and
assist in the cultivation of virtues like justice. But its purpose was to prepare the Jewish
people for the arrival of Jesus and the New Law. For this reason, Aquinas says the Old
Law is good, but incomplete (ST 1a2ae 98.1).
According to Aquinas, the fulfillment of humanity’s supernatural vocation is only
possible through the New Law (lex nova), or the law of the Gospel (ST 1a2ae 106.1).38
The work of Christ’s righteousness completes or perfects what the Old Law intends,
which is the eternal happiness of union with God. Freedom or salvation from sinfulness is
38
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made possible through the New Law of Christ and the faith born from it. The New Law is
delivered by the grace of the Holy Spirit that instructs humans about the twofold Gospel
ethic to love God and love neighbor. Unlike the moral precepts of the Old Law that are
external written commandments for ordering people toward justice and friendship with
one another, the New Law of love is an interior prompting of grace that allows friendship
with God. Therefore the New Law is like the natural law in the sense that it is an internal
prompting.39 But instead of reason and desire as the prompting mechanism, the grace of
the Spirit is what moves one to act. Grace is superadded to nature so that humans are able
to attain friendship and union with God thus establishing a higher mode (altiori modo) of
participating in the eternal law.
A new order of virtues is accessible through the gift of grace. Aquinas refers to
these as “infused” or theological virtues which are listed in St. Paul’s famous words to
the church at Corinth: “And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest
of these is love.”40 The supernatural virtues make it possible for those humans who
possess them to be “good” (DQChar 2 r). The graced virtue of love or charity is the
“mother” and “moving cause” of all the virtues (DQChar 3 riii). It unites us to God
“through the actions of our intelligence and feelings” (DQChar 2.7) thereby establishing
a connatural relationship with God that is the basis of divine friendship.

39
40

Ibid.
1 Cor 13.12

79

Chapter Four: “Nature” and the Hypergood
The term “nature” as a normative expression might appear trivial with the
historicizing of natural law and designating it as a cultural construct. But this is not the
case for the natural law traditions in question because nature is a necessary concept for
ethical reflection. According to Novak, the ontological constitution of natural law is the
work of theology whereas the ethical constitution of natural law is the work of
philosophy. Since our approach is both religious and ethical, ontology and ethics
designate this fundamental dimension of natural law to which we now turn, which is also
inescapably metaethical.
For the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, “nature” is rooted in a constitutive
truth or higher law that transcends all particularity. Nature itself is posited by the
objective reality—the Dhamma and God—that precedes and extends beyond the human
person. Buddhadasa cited this similarity between both traditions in the following manner:
“Natural law governs creation and has power over it. In this sense dhamma functions as
the Buddhist God” (my emphasis).1 Perhaps familiar with Aquinas, Buddhadasa
acknowledged that Dhamma is like the eternal law of God in the sense that both govern
the natural order of human beings. Therefore, harmony with Dhamma or participation in
the eternal law is the proper orientation of nature.

1

Buddhadasa, 133.

80

It is in the context of “nature” from the level of special insight or revelation that
the Dhamma and the eternal law provide an “infinite” or “empty” measure of all human
acts. From the perspective of general knowledge, these natural law traditions claim that
“justice” is the measure of human acts. In both traditions, justice refers to a kind of
rendering of what is due. Concepts like fairness, equality, restitution, and retribution
define the measure of justice. It is only from within the natural law traditions and the
perspective of revelation and insight that an ultimate standard can be defended.
When a natural law account removes this ultimate or transcendent measure of the
human then it runs the risk of absolutizing nature. This is where natural law becomes
dangerous and is susceptible to the homogenization of natural law discourse. Such a
move is a form of ontological violence, which refers to a final or complete account of
nature having been fully disclosed or defined. Ontological violence wedded with politics
was evident, perhaps in the most extreme form, in Nazi Germany’s Aryan eugenics, but
also in the constitutional history of the United States. The Dred Scott v. Sanford Supreme
Court ruling of 1857, which Abraham Lincoln publicly opposed, declared that blacks
were non-citizens or non-persons thereby depriving them of their “inalienable rights” and
any legal protection from slavery.2 These two examples would have included both
religious and secular proponents of ontological violence and terror. Hitler’s irreligious
anti-Semitism coalesced with German Christian anti-Jewish nationalists. The fact is that
terror can surface with little or no opposition in any society unable to measure itself
against a higher law or transcendent order.
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I claimed that the natural law traditions in question overcome the temptation of
ontological violence by identifying an ultimate measure as the constitutive truth that
transcends or grounds reality. As a result, in light of the constitutive truth and the
authoritative traditions that preserve it, “nature” is a revisable normative concept. It does
not have the fixity or absoluteness that leads to ontological violence. To assure this, I
restate that Dhamma is the “empty” measure of all things and the eternal law is the
“infinite” measure of all persons.3 Because of these higher laws, nature also has, in a
certain sense, directionality. The law of nature measured by emptiness and infinity has a
teleological orientation that for both traditions ends in liberation or salvation. I refer to
this teleological orientation as a “hypergood,” a concept borrowed from moral and
political philosopher, Charles Taylor. It refers to those higher goods, “which not only are
incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these
must be weighed, judged, decided about.”4
In our traditions, the hypergoods refer to the unconditioned awareness of
enlightenment (nibbāna) and the perfected state of happiness (beatitudo). All other
goods, or limited goods like virtuous actions, are seen as secondary, though perhaps
necessary to achieving the hypergood in this life or the next. The truth or law that
constitutes the hypergood is the “constitutive good.” Taylor defines the constitutive good
as “the order of being or principle of that order.”5 We said earlier that the overriding good
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or constitutive good is equal to the constitutive truth and higher law. Therefore, Dhamma
and God constitute this teleological orientation of the moral life and religious quest.
This model afforded by the natural law traditions can address one of the major
ethical problems for natural law thinking since the Enlightenment: the separation of isought. I concur with scholar Pamela Hall when she says that this separation “seems
precisely inimical to any authentic doctrine of natural law.”6 Although she was referring
to the Thomistic tradition, this can also apply to the Theravāda natural law tradition. Both
traditions require congruence between the way things are and the way they ought to be.
The protean term “nature” that is posited by the constitutive truth establishes normativity
within these traditions. I noted that this ontological outlook is also inherently comparative
in these traditions since moral truth is shared across traditions. I shall designate it as the
“is” dimension of natural law thinking because it provides the ontological starting point
of moral agency.
On the other hand, without the appropriate instruction from the source of truth,
nature is incapable of achieving the aim. Nature points to the hypergood. As such, I
designate the hypergood as the “ought” or ethical dimension of natural law thinking. The
hypergoods are “a step to higher moral consciousness” and this undoubtedly means a
deeper engagement with the world as a moral agent.7 Because these refer to the perfected
state of happiness or unconditioned awareness of enlightenment in these traditions, they
provide the content for an image of the good that orients nature toward its end. The
hypergood represents what “ought” to be for the religious practitioner. In this model of
natural law ethics, nature seeks the hypergood, or is Æ ought. The higher law or
6
7

Hall, 18.
Taylor, 64.
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constitutive truth of Dhamma and the eternal law are the inspirational sources of the
moral life that posit “nature,” but also give its proper orientation to the hypergood.
Conditionality and Enlightenment
The Theravāda tradition identifies “three characteristics of existence” (tilakkhana)
that include suffering, impermanence, and not-self. They are, in other words, the truths
that define the conditionality of all living things. Therefore, I identify “nature” as
conditionality. Every person starts from this situation. Person, in Theravāda terms, refers
to the five aggregates that comprise this particular existence. The task of the Buddhist
practitioner is to penetrate these truths and recognize the law of nature governing this
conditionality. The regulative justice of the law of kamma, as noted, is generally
observable. With this mundane awareness, one is able to at most recognize the truths of
suffering and impermanence. As a measure of justice, the law of kamma is purely
retributive. It renders good and bad consequences determined by wholesome (kusala) and
unwholesome (akusala) actions.
The special insight of the Buddhadhamma, on the other hand, discloses another
law the knowledge of which extinguishes the effects of kamma. This is the law of
interdependence or dependent origination. It is a non-linear causal law that illuminates
the conditions of the arising and passing away of suffering and impermanent phenomena.
Moreover, the special experiential insight into dependent origination leads to a direct
realization of the truth of not-self. Gotama Buddha taught, “What is nonself should be
seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not
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my self.’ When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes
dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by nonclinging (SN 22:45; III 44-45).”
As Buddhadasa put it, “all suffering arises from me and mine.”8 And what he
meant by “me and mine” are the five aggregates (khandhas) deluded by wrong view,
attachments, and clinging. Buddhadasa also stated that the perception of not-self is “the
transcending of all kamma” thereby illustrating awareness of it as a higher level of
insight.9 Penetrating this Buddhadhamma level of insight into the truth of not-self and the
law of interdependent arising is synonymous with attaining enlightenment.
That enlightenment can be designated as the hypergood is confirmed by the
teaching: “The Buddhas declare that nibbāna is the supreme state (paramam)” (Dh 184).
Damien Keown has also made great efforts to compare enlightenment in Buddhism with
flourishing (eudaimonia) in Aristotle, both serving as the highest good (summum
bonum).10 Although I would argue that this Buddhist-Aristotelian comparison is
problematic,11 its point is well taken. According to Gotama Buddha, enlightenment is the
destruction of the three cardinal vices: lust (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha)
(SN 38:1; IV 251-52). In the same Nikāya, the Buddha identifies thirty-three synonyms
for what he refers to as “the unconditioned,” including terms like “the far shore,” “the
sublime,” and “the deathless” (SN 43:1-44, combined; IV 359-373). The unconditioned is
none other than enlightenment. It is the “destination” of those on the Eightfold Path
(Ibid.).
8

See Buddhadasa, Chapter 5.
Ibid., 135.
10
See Keown (2001), Chapter 8.
11
For example, Aristotle’s account eudaimonia is purely mundane, whereas the pursuit of enlightenment
unfolds over countless lifetimes. This is why I prefer to use Taylor’s notion of hypergood, since it is more
Platonic than Aristotelian in the sense that pursuit of the hypergood can transcend this world.
9
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Although there might be a distinction between the kammic and nibbanic paths, the
ultimate aim for both is enlightenment. Achieving this unconditioned awareness by
experiential insight of the true Dhamma discloses the true measure of all things,
emptiness (suññatā). Buddhadasa equates emptiness with the truth of not-self, saying it
represents the “highest dhamma” and that it “makes a man immortal because it makes
him free of the self idea.”12 The unconditioned or “empty” measure of all things is
understood by those having penetrated the true Dhamma. In other words, there is no
condition and there is no limit to the dignity of all living things. The empty measure
provided by the true Dhamma thus surpasses the measure of retributive justice regulated
by kamma.
Reason and Happiness
According to Jean Porter, a Thomistic scholar, Aquinas’s account of nature fits
appropriately within his medieval scholastic context that understood “nature as reason.”13
Reason, in most of the Western philosophical tradition, was seen as the defining
characteristic of nature distinguishing humans from the lower animals. In the Summa,
Thomas is in accord with this view when he claims that all operations or actions are the
works of reason (ratio) and will (voluntas) and that the will is moved by appetite and
commanded by reason (ST 1a2ae 91.2 r2). This is distinctively human agency that is
ordered by reason.
We noted earlier that reason is the analogous imprint of the imago dei, and being
such, it contains the light of moral discernment. And this light that originates in God is

12
13

Buddhadasa, 135.
Porter, 231-4.
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none other than the natural law. Therefore, “the natural law is constituted through reason
(per rationem constitutum)” (ST 1a2ae 94.1). “Nature” as reason, which contains the
precepts of the natural law, provides the proper teleological orientation of human agency.
Since all actions are for the sake of some end and that end is simultaneously a good one,
the good that everyone seeks is felicity or happiness (felicitas vel beatitudo) (ST 1a2ae
90.2 c1). The last end of the natural law that issues in happiness is, as we have noted, the
common good. Achieving these goods is expressive of a flourishing, healthy society. It
was also mentioned that human law, at its best, serves the purpose of securing these
goods of society and individuals by properly guiding the orientation of natural law.
The virtue that best promotes the common good, according to St. Thomas, is
justice (justitia), which means “none other than to render to each his own” (ST 2a2ae
58.11). This is not merely retributive justice, as is the case with punishing a criminal, but
also includes restitution and fair distribution of social goods. Justice is perhaps the most
important social virtue because it is the basis of a peaceful society by properly ordering
all relationships. Moreover, justice is a virtue that is certainly attainable among those
with general knowledge because “it is the only virtue of the will that can be acquired
without grace.”14
Human law and the moral virtues of justice and prudence demonstrate the
capacities of the natural law among those with general knowledge. For Aquinas,
happiness can be achieved on this level, albeit an imperfect form (beatitudo imperfecta).
The reality for Thomas is that no form of happiness achieved in this life is perfect. Not
even that given by the divine law. But what the divine law offers, especially the New
14

Porter, 204.
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Law, is a higher mode (altiori modo) of participating in the eternal law, and therefore a
more profound happiness, in this life. We noted that the Spirit of grace and charity
transforms humans in such a way so that they can attain a deeper friendship with God.
The perfect fulfillment of friendship or union with God is only available in the beatific
vision of heaven. It is in this heavenly state that perfect happiness consists.
Since God is love,15 the eternal law can be nothing other than the perfect
expression of the law of love. This is why the New Law of Christ’s love is the highest
expression of the eternal law. It offers a more fulfilling happiness than natural happiness.
Participation in the eternal law by way of divine law initiates the standard of love as the
new measure of human dignity and human acts as illustrated in the following statement
by Aquinas: “For the uncreated law [the law of love] is the first standard and measure of
our love” (DQChar 1.23). Aquinas is clear to point out that the infused virtue of charity
that serves as our new standard “has no limit” (DQChar 2.13). Thus, reason is no longer
bound to the limits of nature and natural justice because it is now opened to the infinite
measure of love. This is the supernatural vocation of humanity offered by Christ that
serves as the infinite measure of human dignity.

15

1 John 4.8
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Conclusion: Natural Law Ethics and Human Dignity
Our investigation of natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions
concludes with a shared horizon of a global neighborly ethic in view. This shared horizon
locates commonalities with the neighbor as well as differences. In this ethic, the close
proximity and distance of the neighbor hangs in balance. It is from this standpoint that the
dignity of the neighbor can be protected.
The distance or otherness of the neighbor is secured by the autonomy granted to
her tradition. Any moral authoritarian attempt to swallow the neighbor’s tradition into its
own is bad faith and not characteristic of these natural law traditions. That is because the
neighbor’s tradition is guaranteed in theory to be, at minimum, open to the general
knowledge upon which any revelation or special insight depends. Because of this
autonomy of the neighbor’s tradition based on the view that they are “outside” of the
tradition that receives the special insight or revelation, they may draw different moral
conclusions regarding certain matters. Moral diversity is therefore a brute fact supported
by the natural law traditions.
On the other hand, the close proximity of the neighbor is always assumed because
she shares a common humanity or “nature.” By having this common “nature,” her
tradition is guaranteed the possibility of attaining at least general knowledge. We noted
that this general knowledge, in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, is rooted in the
law of kamma or the lex naturalis. General knowledge of these laws provides the basis
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for rational assessments and discourse across traditions thus overcoming the relativist
challenge. This is not to say that the neighbor’s tradition is incapable of knowing more
than what is generally accessible. The aims of interreligious dialogue and even
comparative theology enters here as an exciting prospect of locating deeper truths among
traditions than basic moral truths. Therefore, recognizing ethical commonalities, sharing
insights, and receiving mutual illumination are the fruits of maintaining the close
proximity and otherness of the neighbor.
By putting our two traditions in dialogue with each other, we can see the level of
general discourse in operation. For example, we noted that Gotama Buddha recognized
the importance and value of the Five Precepts (pañca-sīla). He declared that these
teachings about what unwholesome actions should be avoided were ancient, traditional,
and unadulterated precepts that preexisted his teaching. In other words, they were
naturally accessible and valuable independent of the special insight of the
Buddhadhamma. These precepts are meant to be the basis for purifying the three doors of
kamma: body, speech, and mind.
In the Thomistic tradition, Aquinas’s discussion of the Decalogue and the
propaedeutic role of the divine law for natural law functions in a similar way to the Five
Precepts. St. Thomas claims that although the Decalogue is divine law, its purpose in
educating the natural law demonstrates that its precepts are accessible to all by virtue of
natural reason. That is so because the natural law obliges all “to refrain from doing harm,
whether by deed, word, or thought” to one’s neighbor (ST 1a2ae, 100).
From this comparison of both traditions, we can locate ethical commonality on
the precepts against lying, stealing, killing, and sexual misconduct. These shared precepts
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constitute a minimum neighborly ethic. At its very least, natural law thinking can set the
limits to fundamental norms of human dignity. At most, natural law thinking can stretch
the limits of the human imagination for compassion, love, and interdependence. That is
possible, after all, since truth is the measure of all warrants and if truth is “empty” or
“infinite,” the possibilities for natural law ethics within a secular democratic context are
more than promising.
I conclude by stating that natural law traditions embodied in institutions like the
sangha and the church have something essential to offer for the health of democratic
societies. What is that? The answer comes from no greater example in than the Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr., who wrote the following in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”:
[…] there are two types of laws: there are just and there are unjust laws… Now
what is the difference between the two? How does one determine when a law is
just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares away with the moral
law or law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral
law. To put it in terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law
that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.1
Notice that Reverend King did not say that an unjust law is a human law not
rooted in divine law. He mentioned only the eternal law and the natural law. That is
because he recognized the autonomy and dignity of natural law, but also the sovereignty
of God. From a natural law perspective, we ought to be in harmony with eternal law, and
respectively, with Dhamma. As evident, the natural law traditions claim that some form
of harmony through participation in the eternal law or understanding of Dhamma is
possible in other traditions. But through the divine law and the Buddhadhamma, one is
able to participate in the eternal law in a higher mode or understand the fullness of

1

Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that
Changed the World, ed. James Melvin Washington (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 89.
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Dhamma leading to liberation in this life. From the revelation or special insight of a
natural law perspective, the natural law within us should be the “infinite measure” or
“empty measure” of our human laws. In the Thomistic tradition, we have seen that the
“infinite measure” refers to the eternal law that cannot be fully comprehended, which is
the uncreated law of love. For Theravāda Buddhism, the “empty measure” refers to the
law of interdependence and the law of emptiness or not-self.
These natural law traditions therefore respect the autonomy of other traditions,
promote discourse, and contain the resources for defending human dignity. These natural
law traditions place no limit on human dignity and no limit on taking care of creation or
the existence of all living things because all human laws are measured by infinity or
emptiness. As such, there is no limit to how good one can be. Simultaneously, natural law
thinking recognizes that there is a limit on how bad one should be. Those shared moral
precepts stated earlier serve as an illustration of this limit.
Natural law thinking, therefore, does have something essential to offer a
democratic society: it can evoke the audacity to challenge any unjust human law, no
matter who institutes it. As Novak puts it, “Natural law, then, is the necessary and
perpetual critique needed by all culture and all positive law, even by that culture whose
adherents are still conscious of its origin in revelation.2 This is the perennial promise of
natural law ethics in a world of neighbors.

2

Novak (1998), 193.
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